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The Heart of the Matter: The
Property Right Conferred by
Copyright
by Douglas Y'Barbo*
All puffed up with vanity
we see what we want to see
to the powerful and the wise
the mirror always lies
let's paint the mirror black
paint it black.
- Neil Peart, War Paint
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Introduction

The purpose of this Article is to offer a single coherent model that
explains copyright law's essential features and to apply the model to
reconcile the apparently disparate infringement decisions that comprise
contemporary copyright law.
The fundamental premise underlying copyright law-and the one that
I intend to dislodge-is that a copyright is a limited property right in
relation to the author's original text. The thesis of this Article is that
a "copyright" is not an enforceable property right in relation to a
particular work of authorship or the expression embodied in it (i.e., "a
text"). Instead, I shall demonstrate that it is a far more qualified

* Intellectual Property Attorney, Schlumberger Dowell, Sugar Land, Texas.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.S., 1992); University of Chicago (J.D., 1995). I
am grateful for the excellent editorial assistance of Amy Werner and Carol Hewey. The
author's email address is y-barbo@sugar-land.dowell.slb.com.
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property right in relation to a legally structured market position. Put
another way, copyright infringement is best viewed as an unfair
intrusion upon the copyright owner's actual or putative market position
from which to exploit his or her text, rather than as an isolated,
unauthorized borrowing of original portions of the copyrighted text. One
material implication of this view is that copyright law is far more closely
related to common law misappropriation of the type found in INS v. AP 1
than to a pure property regime (for example, patent law).
For years commentators have debated whether copyright is the ideal
regime to encourage the creation of original works of authorship.2 Yet
no one has posed the predicate question that seems so obviously crucial
to the debate: what does copyright law actually grant to the author?
Or, precisely in what does the property right reside? Instead, commentators have assumed that the answer was in every instance: the text.
Everyone, it seems, has implicitly assumed that copyright law confers a
property right in relation to the actual text that the author creates (and,
of course, substantially similar abstractions from it).' Indeed, the
question whether a lifetime monopoly is necessary to encourage the
creation of original works certainly depends upon the breadth of the
monopoly one has in mind.
This Article also responds to much of the recent commentary offering
proposals for reform of copyright law. A discussion of these efforts
should better orient the reader to the novel approach offered in this
Article. The response does not appear in a single section, however, but
is placed as brief digressions throughout the text as issues arise that
implicate particular commentary.
B. Summary
1. The Thesis. The objective of this Article is neither piecemeal
revision nor a sweeping polemic followed by an unrealistic and unsubstantiated proposal for reform. Instead, I intend this Article to furnish
a comprehensive model that explains and justifies the essential features
of the copyright infringement standard. This section presents the thesis
along with a thorough summary of the major grounds of support. The
1. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Meritsof Copyright: The Challenges
of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (1989)
("The works so fixed-whether pencil-written melodies, tape-recorded symphonies, printed
books, or computer programs embedded in plastic disks-have identifiable boundaries and
stable identities much as physical things do." (citations omitted)).
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reason for this detailed summary is to allow the reader to quickly assess
the major points offered in support of this Article's thesis before I
proceed to a more exhaustive discussion that follows.
The Copyright Code defines a copyright claim in a text as though it
were property.4 It expressly enumerates rights over which the copyright
owner has exclusive dominion and later defines the unauthorized
exercise of those rights as "infringement.' 5 Yet the real test of whether
something, particularly an incorporeal something, possesses the
attributes of property depends upon whether the property owner has the
absolute right to exclude all others (i.e., is it an enforceable right and
against whom) and whether the owner has the right to exercise complete
control over his or her property. Therefore, a regime based on the
grant of property rights (i.e., exclusive rights to make copies, prepare
derivative works, and so forth) should condemn any, or almost any,
unauthorized exercise of those exclusive rights as an improper intrusion
upon the copyright owner's property, against anyone. Copyright law
does not. Moreover, a regime based on the grant of a property right in
a text should, of course, subsume a mechanism-either through an ex
ante registration practice or judicially as a predicate to the infringement
analysis-to determine the boundaries of that property right in the thing
borrowed. Copyright law does not.
Instead, unlike patent law, a copyright plaintiff must, as part of her
prima facie case, affirmatively disprove that the defendant independently created the accused work (i.e., without copying from the plaintiff's
work). More specifically, the copyright plaintiff must show that the
defendant copied from the plaintiff's work. Proof of copying then permits
the factfinder to infer that the accused infringer substantially reduced
his overall cost of expression (i.e., cost of creating the work), which would
allow her to set a price below the plaintiff's marginal cost because the
former has a lower cost of expression to recoup.
The ultimate infringement decision is left, in the case of fiction works
anyway, to the "ordinary observer" who, after a deliberately unanalytical
review of the two texts, condemns the latter as an infringement if it
appears to him to have been derived from the former text. It is
impossible to overstate the judicial emphasis on the "unanalytical"

4. In this Article, I use the term "work" and "text" more or less interchangeably
although in other contexts the two terms are distinct. See Douglas Y'Barbo, § 411 and
Determiningthe Scope of a CopyrightRegistration,34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343 (1977).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(a) (1994).
6. See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JUSPRUDENCE 113 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961). Honore's definition of property consists of two elements: exclusion and

control.

646

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

character of this test; thus, "[tihe two works involved in this appeal
should be considered and tested, not hypercritically or with meticulous
scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the average
reasonable reader or spectator."'
This dependence on the consumer's perception of the accused text
compared with the original is the true sine qua non of copyright
infringement; without this, then regardless of the quantitative extent of
copying, infringement is rarely found, as we shall see. Put another way,
according to the contemporary copyright infringement standard, merely
borrowing protectable expression is not enough. The average consumer
must actually perceive some similarity; otherwise, there is no infringement. Indeed, a thorough review of the case law reveals an astonishingly poor correlation between the frequency of infringement verdicts and
the quantity of protectable expression taken from the first text.' This
observation alone suggests an alternate criterion by which copyright
infringement is actually determined.
For many reasons, some of which are discussed in more detail later,
this is a peculiar way to enforce a property right that resides in a text.
For instance, in the case of patents the accused device and the relevant
patent claim are compared element by element. The overall similarity
between the device and the claim is irrelevant; instead, what matters is
whether every element comprising the claim is present in the accused
device. Only then does the similarity become infringement. By contrast,
copyright law deliberately eschews a piecemeal analysis of the two texts
in favor of the factfinder's desultory hunch. Indeed, not only does
copyright law not rely upon an analytical comparison of the two works,
but it expressly forbids it, electing instead for the ordinary observer's
unreflective impression. If we assume that copyright law grants a

7. Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)).
8. The skeptical reader is invited to compare the following sets of cases. These cases

comprise a "low-copying" group in which infringement was found: Robert R. Jones Assoc.,
Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Horgan v. MacMillian, Inc., 789 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1986); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y.

1980); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Hedeman v. Tap-Rite Prods. Corp., 22S F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1964); Addison-Wesley Publ'g
Co. v. Brown, 133 USPQ 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Warren v. White & WykoffMfg. Co., 39 F.2d

922 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). By contrast, these cases comprise a "high-copying" group in which
infringement was not found: Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987);

Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyher v. Children's
Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel

Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters. Ltd.,

5 USPQ 2d 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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property right in relation to a text, then the ordinary observer test is
among the least reliable or sensible means of enforcement. In many
instances the ordinary observer, by his deliberately casual inspection of
the two texts, cannot possibly determine whether one contains protectable expression borrowed from the other (for example, suppose one was
a novel, the other a film). But what the observer can do is determine
whether a putative consumer will confuse the two works, believing one
to be derived from the other. The only possible rationale for this legal
standard then is that it protects the copyright owners from harm to their
preferred market position-harm whose proper measure is consumer
confusion over the original and accused works. Nonfiction works are
judged differently (the ordinary observer standard is not used) though
with the same result and, as we shall see, for the same reason.
Finally, this latter observation suggests that the relationship between
the copyrightable features of a particular text and those elements
responsible for its aesthetic appeal (and hence, roughly, its economic
value) is remote. In other words, quite often those elements of a text
responsible for its aesthetic appeal are not elements that independently
qualify for copyright protection (e.g., they are not original, too abstract,
etc.). This fragile relationship between copyrightability and economic
value further suggests that the property right conferred by copyright
resides in something other than the text.
None of these facts is consistent with a regime that grants a property
right in strict relation to a text, and taken together, they are convincing
evidence that it does not. I suggest that the only plausible explanation
is that a copyright is more correctly characterized as a property right in
relation to a legally structured market position rather than as a property
right in relation to a text.
In summary, my thesis is that a "copyright" is not an enforceable
property right in relation to a particular work of authorship or the
expression embodied in it (i.e., "a text"); it is instead a far more qualified
property right in relation to a legally structured market position. My
argument in support of this thesis consists of the following bases. First,
no such property right in a text is ever defined either during registration
or during litigation. Second, the genuine focus of the infringement test
is on the method of infringement rather than what is infringed. Third,
the ultimate infringement analysis is left to the casual observer who
eschews analytical comparison of the two texts in favor of an uncritical
impression. Finally, the copyrightable portions of the text correspond
poorly to those elements responsible for the text's economic value.
2. Reconciling the Case Law. The model offered in this Article
unifies the highly disparate body of case law relating to copyright
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infringement of literary texts, which is completely irreconcilable under
current orthodoxy. For instance, of the hundreds of reported cases
involving alleged infringement of fiction works (novels, plays, movies),
the plaintiffs have won only a handful of them. Indeed, an accused
infringer can liberally borrow a prior text's theme, plot, basic sequence
of events, and characters with impunity as long as the prose or dialogue
is changed.9
One very visible and very robust polar exception exists, which I shall
refer to as "character cases." In these the accused infringer borrows a
widely recognized central character from the prior work. Although the
accused infringer may recast the character in an entirely different
setting with a different theme, plot, sequence of events, dialogue, and so
forth, and indeed even in a different medium of expression, courts almost
always condemn the use provided that the character is sufficiently well
known (i.e., that he is identifiable in the accused work upon casual
inspection by the general public). Usually the character is readily
identifiable because the accused infringer uses the original character's
name. Some examples include the following: "Superman," ° "Mickey
Mouse,"" "Tarzan," 1 and "Conan.""3

In each of these cases, the

accused text had a different plot, setting, essential sequence of events,
supporting characters, and tone, but the court nevertheless found
infringement. The only way to reconcile this exception with the larger
body of authority on infringement of fiction works is to recognize that
what the accused infringer copied is the identifying feature of the prior
work-the work's "trademark"-the single most important characteristic
that would cause consumers to believe the latter work was derived from
the prior one after a casual glance at the two. On the other hand, other
literary elements far more worthy of legal protection-such as theme,
plot, setting, basic sequence of events, and the precise juxtaposition of
all of these elements to one another-are easily borrowed from a prior
work and once incorporated into the accused work become hidden from
the ordinary observer's view by recombining them with additional
elements. For this reason this type of borrowing is hardly ever
condemned. In Kretschmer v. Warner Brothers,' for instance, the
accused infringer's film borrowed plaintiff-novelist's theme, plot, main
characters, setting, essential sequence of events, and numerous discrete
9. See Douglas Y'Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting
Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299 (1998).

10. Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981).
11.

Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).

12. Burroughs v. MGM, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
13. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
14. No. 93CIV.1730 (CSH), 1994 WL 259814, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994).
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events, but the court excused the copying. 5 So copyright law permits
this type of copying apparently on the ground that the accused work is
not likely to harm the market for the original because the ordinary
observer sees little, if any, connection between the two that is not
otherwise attributable to similar genre and so forth.
Next, consider Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.PR.v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc.'" There the accused infringer created a story of the O.J. Simpson
trial, borrowing the literary style of Dr. Seuss but no other aspect of Dr.
Seuss's works. 7 The court wasted no time condemning the accused
text. 8 Yet, this case is completely unjustified on traditional copyright
grounds. Copyright law has never been extended to protect literary
style. However, in this instance it was: "Dr. Seuss creates a pleasing
rhythm and whimsical effect through the use of two perfectly rhyming,
monotonic couplets, unified by epistrophe. [I]n the second passage, Dr.
Seuss's choices as to stanza type (tercet), rhyme (masculine perfect),
assonance, and accent are all protectable and all appropriated." 19 The
only conceivable basis for ignoring settled doctrine is that the "style" in
this instance was a highly unique, and more importantly, widely
recognizable one-the jittery, staccato prose-poetry of Dr. Seuss that is
familiar to nearly everyone. So what was the property right being
protected here? Surely not one residing in the text because what was
taken was, beyond a shadow of a doubt, not protectable by copyright law.
Indeed, what was actually protected was Dr. Seuss's market position
from which to exploit his works, whose primary, indeed sole identifying
characteristic, is literary style.
Contrast this case with Musto v. Meyer.2' In Musto plaintiff had
written a scholarly article on the history of cocaine use in Europe and
America in the nineteenth century. One highlight of the article is
Musto's amusing speculation that Sherlock Holmes may have been a
frequent cocaine user, which would explain several bizarre events in
Doyle's novels about Holmes. The accused work was a novel whose plot
structure is derived from Musto's "hypothesis." That is, the events
comprising the novel were all taken from the Musto article, and in some
instances Musto's prose was copied nearly word for word. Indeed, the
accused work was nothing more than Musto's article recast in novel

15. Id. at *11.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
Id. at 1561.
Id. at 1576.
Id. at 1564.
434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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form;2 nevertheless, the court found no infringement 2 2-it is difficult
to say why. It might have been because plaintiff's work was published
in the Journalof the American Medical Association and defendant's was
a mainstream commercial novel. It may also have been because
plaintiff's article was a scholarly work (though the portion taken was
not) while defendant's was purely fiction; or it may have been because
Musto did not commercialize his work-it was simply given free of
charge to the journal to publish. 2' All of these factors suggest that
Musto was highly unlikely to have suffered any market harm due to the
copying even though the entire essence-the novel feature of his
work-was taken.
One final example is Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc.24 In this case the
accused infringer published a book entitled The Nutcracker: A Story &
A Ballet, which consisted of text (interviews with the dancers) plus
photographs taken during a performance of the New York City Ballet
Company's production of The Nutcracker Ballet. The choreographer
(actually the administratrix of his estate) sued the book publisher
claiming the photographs infringed the copyright in the choreography for
the ballet.2" A copyright in a choreographic work is extremely specific;
protection is limited to the actual flow of steps or movements necessary
to execute the performance. Hence, the publisher's defense-which
although suspiciously technical was nonetheless legally correct-was
that because plaintiff's copyright covered only the particular flow of
steps, it could not possibly have been infringed by a limited number of
photographs from which it would be absolutely impossible to even begin
to recreate the ballet or to even suggest how it might be performed. As
far as the sets and costumes (the real content of the photographs) were
concerned, plaintiff conceded that they had lapsed into the public domain
long ago and that in any event plaintiff's copyright did not cover
them.2" Yet the court found that the book infringed plaintiff's copyright
even though not one element comprising that copyright could be found
in the accused work. 27 This case suggests that copyright law's pretense
of precision towards the property right at issue is really a subterfuge:
regardless of whether the accused infringer actually borrowed from the
protected "thing," the court will condemn the borrowing if the new work

21. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 33.
24. 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 157. The Copyright Code protects choreographic works according to 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(4) (1994).
26. 789 F.2d at 161.
27. Id. at 164.
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preempts a significant potential or actual source of revenue for the prior
work.
3. Property: Expression Versus Market Position. A few
definitions are required before going further. First, numerous and,
unfortunately, disparate definitions of "property" exist. One commentator remarks:
Property has been variously regarded as all distributable resources, as
alienable entitlements, as an incentive to invest, as a source of
personhood, as economic power, as status, as a share, in society's
wealth, as a reward for effort and talent, as an incentive to labor, as
a ground for inculcating responsibility, as an expression of the free will,
and I am sure, others as well.'
In this Article, I shall use the quite general definition of property
proposed by J.E. Penner, which regards property from the standpoint of
imposing a general duty of noninterference, a duty mediated by the
thing the owner owns and not on the basis of personal relationships
between the duty owner and the property owner.29 According to
Professor Penner, this duty prohibits two general classes of interference:
(1) specific interference with the owner's own use and (2) nonspecific
interference (i.e., the unlicensed use of the property by a nonowner that
to some degree dispossesses the owner).8" Against this theoretical
background, the entitlement conferred by copyright law can be assessed.
Again, the actual property right that copyright law protects relates to
a narrowly drawn market position. A violation of this property right is
determined by the likelihood of economic harm evidenced by erosion to
that preferred market position. This is unusually difficult to measure;
hence, copyright law excuses any accused text regardless of similarity
with the original text if the author of the accused text did not create that
text relying upon the original text. In economic vernacular the accused
infringer is a "free-rider" if he relied upon the prior text in preparing his
own. If free-riding, or the effect of the copying on the second author's
cost of expression, is the primary desideratum in copyright infringement,
then you need a way to predict it. That is what the copyright's copyingaccess requirement does. If the defendant derived or is likely to have
derived his work from the plaintiff's work, then the probability is greater
that he reduced his cost of expression-a cost differential that he can

28. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights"Pictureof Property,43 UCLA L. REV. 711,80001 (1996).
29. Id. at 808.
30. Id.
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exploit in the form of a lower price approaching marginal cost-to the
detriment of the original author who is unable to match that price and
still recoup his own cost of expression. Conversely, without copying,
then regardless of similarity, the defendant did not take a free ride on
the plaintiff's protectable expression. Yet, free-riding is not, without
more, harmful; it merely reduces the expression costs to the subsequent
author. So if she tucks the book away in a locked drawer, the original
author is never harmed. All free-riding tells us is whether the potential
for market harm exists. Therefore, if the defendant did copy from the
plaintiff's text, then a further assay is required to predict probable
market harm. The easiest way to do this is to ask the average consumer
whether he would confuse the two works-be led into thinking that the
latter is derived from the former. Hence, the ordinary observer test is
applied: "The lay listener's reaction is relevant because it gauges the
effect of the defendant's work on the plaintiff's market.""' Thus, the
genuine focus of the copyright infringement analysis is on the method by
which the accused infringer created or acquired the work and the effect
of the accused work on the market for the original rather than on the
text copied.
4. Implications. What is the significance of the recharacterization
proposed in this Article? Reconceiving a copyright as more like a
property right relating to a particular market position rather than as an
absolute property right in the text may at first not appear to mean
much. After all, what value could a legal right to exclusively copy a
particular text have other than the value of exploiting it in a market?
As we shall see, this new paradigm has unusual significance.
First, I just discussed a group of otherwise disparate judicial decisions
that I suggest are adequately reconciled by the model that I offer.
Second, I am not content with a mere linguistic relabeling of the
property right protected by copyright. Redirecting attention towards the
market exploited by the copyright owner and away from his or her text
changes the infringement inquiry completely. Today, commentators
disagree over whether a copyright should protect every unauthorized
borrowing of all or portions of the author's text (the romantic conception
of copyright) or whether copyright law should be delicately calibrated
based on the last increment of protection needed to prevent the author
from not creating the work for fear that the economic return flowing
from the work will be quickly appropriated by others (the instrumentalist conception). All of the evidence presented in this Article converges
to the conclusion that the property right conferred by copyright

31. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
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law-which again seems directed more towards a particular market
position than the text itself-is ostensibly justified (1) by basic considerations of fairness and (2) by a careful titration of legal protection needed
to encourage (or at least not discourage) the creation of original works
of authorship. Put another way, contemporary copyright law does not
appear to permit the copyright owner to capture the full value that
consumers may attach to his or her work, as we shall see, but rather
delimits protection at or near the minimum threshold needed to support
his or her investment.
Third, these are most vexing problems in copyright law. One,
precisely how much material, quantitatively speaking, can the accused
infringer incorporate into his or her own work before infringement
occurs? Second, what level of abstraction of the elements of the work
occur without triggering infringement (e.g., does copyright law proscribe
borrowing of a plot, setting, characters, etc.)? The case law on these two
issues is virtually irreconcilable; no coherent theme is discernable. This
Article suggests that these two questions arise due to the fundamental
misconception of a copyright as a property right in a text. This
paradigm implicitly requires that the factfinder determine the zone of
protectability surrounding the original elements of the author's text. As
we shall see, this determination is virtually intractable and is in fact
almost never performed. Under the view proposed here, which comports
with contemporary authority, these two questions become far less
important.8 2 The proper endpoint for the infringement analysis is not
"how much protectable expression did the accused infringer borrow?" It
is "what is the likelihood of harm to the copyright owner's preferred
market position caused by the unauthorized borrowing as evidenced by
a reasonable likelihood of the diminution of demand for the copyright
owner's work?" Therefore, what is at issue in the question of infringement is the scope of that market position, not the scope of the text itself.
Fourth, copyright law is in serious trouble. Whether this is just a
public-image problem or something much more serious is not yet clear.
For instance, David Nimmer, the editor of the largest treatise on
copyright law, recently authored an article entitled The End of Copyright
in which he prophesied "[tihe end of traditional copyright jurisprudence."38 In addition, there is at present an urgent movement to
develop a third intellectual property paradigm to protect nascent

32. Granted, the copyright owner's legally protected market position does not extend
to proscribe similar works of authorship independently created nor to proscribe works that

borrow only nonoriginal material from the copyright owner's own work. Therefore, the
work's original material must at some point be separated from the nonoriginal material.
33. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1387 (1995).
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technologies (such as internet-related software and artificial intelligencerelated systems) thought to be insufficiently protected by current
regimes.' This perceived need, of course, implies a failure or inability
of copyright and patent law to adequately protect these technologies
sufficiently to encourage the desired level of investment. For instance,
prior to 1971 record manufacturers were forced to rely upon state
misappropriation law to protect sound recordings. Then, in 1971
Congress passed the Sound Recordings Amendment to the Copyright
Code. 5 Hence, the need and proper design for a new paradigm to
protect these technologies require a precise understanding of existing
law, particularly a reliable model regarding what a copyright protects
and what it does not. This Article shall furnish that model.
5. A Brief Digression: One Type of Harm--One Legal Regime.
I find the view discussed above-that a new paradigm is needed to
protect emerging technologies-to be seriously myopic.36 If we enacted
a new intellectual property law every time a new technology arose, then
we would be overrun with them by now. Indeed, whenever such a new
technology arises, Congress or the Supreme Court (sometimes both) has
always provided a timely response-whether for photographs, movies,
phonographic records, high-speed photocopiers, or video cassette
recorders. When they first appeared, all of these technologies posed
apparently insurmountable difficulties for certain classes of authors for
which the Copyright Code provided no relief; in every case Congress
promptly amended the Code. For instance, prior to 1865 a photograph
was apparently not protected under the then-current copyright law
because it was not technically a statutory "writing." Therefore, in 1865
Congress amended the Copyright Act to expressly include photographic
prints within its protectable subject matter.37 The next major technological advance was recorded music. Before 1905 the act of making a
recording by, for instance, a piano roll or phonograph did not appear to
infringe the copyright in the musical score. In 1909 Congress amended
the Copyright Act to close that technological loophole. Another example:
in 1912 the Supreme Court first condemned infringement of a motion

34. See Symposium: Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm,94 COLuM. L.
REV. 2307 (1994).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat.
1873 (1974) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
36. For a contrary view, see Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislationand Technological
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
37. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (addressing the
constitutionality of the 1865 amendment). See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
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picture under the Copyright Code."8 One year later, Congress again
amended the Copyright Statute to include movies. The explosive
advances in high-speed photocopying in the 1960s and 1970s created
entirely unforeseen problems, particularly for publishers of scholarly
journals, which the copiers generally claimed was a "fair use." In
response the 1976 Act included section 108, a provision that permits the
owner of the copy to make a single additional copy. 9 The increased use
of home videotaping machines ("VCRs") led to a similar problem; private
viewers could tape an entire copyrighted television show and watch it
later. Again, the Supreme Court responded to create a safe harbor for
this type of copying ("time shifting").' These few examples should
suffice to show that a technological advance that implicates the
copyright law is followed immediately by a suitable legislative or judicial
response.
Finally, consonant with the reconception of copyright proposed in this
Article, it appears that copyright law is far more closely related to
common law misappropriation of the type found in INS v. AP rather
than to a pure property right regime (e.g., patent law). If nothing else,
this result, if true, suggests that we re-evaluate our current taxonomy
of intellectual property law. This shall be discussed in more detail much
later in this Article. The section that follows is a brief summary of the
contemporary infringement standard.
II.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT STANDARD

A.

Introduction
Describing the test for copyright infringement is a complicated task.
For one thing, there are a plethora of variants that cannot all be
reconciled back towards a single coherent standard. For another, it has
too many steps and it is very time-consuming to apply. Below, I shall
discuss the infringement standard that originated with the Second
4 1 There is a second infringement test that
Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter.
was first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.42 and followed by
several circuits. The court in Krofft named this test the "intrinsic/extrinsic test"43 though later decisions within the Ninth Circuit have
38. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976).
40. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
42. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).

43. Id. at 1165.
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slightly modified and renamed the test the "objective/subjective" test.44
Quite clearly, this test is based on a creative misreading of Arnstein,
which it purports to follow.45 Nevertheless, if one looks closely enough,

one would see that the two tests are more or less the same, particularly
when one accounts for the gradual refinements to the objective/subjective
test over the past twenty years.4
To prevail on a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
prove: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original."47
Ownership of a Valid Copyright
The existence of a valid copyright and ownership by the plaintiff are
easiest to prove if he can produce a copyright registration for the work
that he alleges the defendant infringed. Under the Copyright Statute,
the registration- provided that it was obtained within five years after
first publication-is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright
and all of the facts it contains, which includes the copyright's owner.'
Moreover, because the Statute requires a putative copyright plaintiff to
register his copyright before he can bring suit anyway, this is no doubt
the most common means to prove the existence of a valid copyright.49
B.

C. Copying
Ownership is the first element. Here is the second: copying protected
material. This element is further split into two prongs, which go by a
number of terms: "actual copying" and "improper appropriation" are as
common as any. What they mean is this: a copyright plaintiff must
first prove that the defendant's accused work is derived from the
plaintiff's (actual copying); then he must show that what the defendant
copied from it were protectable elements comprising his copyright

44. Id.; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398
(1997). "We have recently modified the Krofft test, bringing it more in line with the tests

followed in other circuits." Id. (citations omitted). "[T]he two tests are more sensibly
described as objective and subjective analyses of expression .... " Id. (quoting Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990)).
45. 562 F.2d at 1165.
46. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir.
1994).
47. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also,
e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994).
49. Id. § 411(a): "No action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be
instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this
title."

1998]

COPYRIGHT LAW

657

(improper appropriation). In other words, the copyright plaintiff must,
as part of his prima facie case, affirmatively disprove independent
creation of the accused work by the defendant.
For the copying prong (to prove substantial similarity) of the test,
expert testimony is permitted.50 For instance, a literature professor
could be called upon to testify whether the defendant copied from the
plaintiff's work. Oddly though, expert testimony is not permissible for
the second prong, substantial similarity.'
D.

Actual Copying

Actual copying by the defendant of the plaintiff's work can be proven
in one of two ways: either by direct evidence or inferentially by proof of
access to the plaintiff's work plus substantial similarity between the
accused work and the plaintiff's.52 In other words, the plaintiff can
either catch the defendant red-handed or else rely on circumstantial
evidence. For this prong courts generally apply an implicit indifferencecurve analysis, which just means that the greater the similarity between
the plaintiff's work and the accused, the less evidence of access is
required and, of course, vice versa. For instance, at one extreme of this
curve when the accused work is "strikingly similar" to the plaintiff's,
courts often immediately shift the burden onto the defendant to show
independent creation, thus relieving the plaintiff of having to offer any
evidence of access.5"
As mentioned in the Introduction, the focus in the copyright infringement test is away from the text and towards the defendant's behavior
and whether it results in economic harm to the plaintiff. Indeed, a
literary text is intrinsically resistant to a precise definition of its scope
of protectable material. Because of this intrinsic resistance, the copyingaccess prong serves as a proxy to, in effect, define the copyright's scope
at least for the limited purposes of enforcing the legal right.
ImproperAppropriation

E.

To establish improper appropriation, the plaintiff must show
"substantial similarity" between the two works with respect to protectable elements of the plaintiff's work." As the reader can see, "substan-

50. Arustein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1946). This case is generally viewed
as the de facto origin of the modem infringement test.

51. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988).
53. Id.
54.

Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tial similarity" appears twice, once in each prong, but they are very
different."
To distinguish between the two, the term "probative
similarity," coined by Professor Latman, is sometimes used to refer to
the "substantial similarity" that appears in the copying prong. The
plaintiff without direct evidence of copying must rely upon evidence
showing access and "probative similarity" (evidence of similarity between
the two works that tends to show that the defendant copied from the
plaintiff's work)."
Substantial similarity is determined by the "ordinary observer" test:
if the ordinary lay observer, viewing or reading the two works as a
whole, would regard their aesthetic appeal as the same, then the accused
work infringes." Two of the most common versions of this test are
recited as follows: (1) "The test for substantial similarity is whether an
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been
appropriated from the copyrighted work;"8 (2) "substantial similarity
should be judged by the spontaneous response of the ordinary lay
observer.""'
Ours is an age in which we regularly perform technological feats of
manipulating copyrighted works, for instance, by seamlessly digitizing
and splicing images and sounds to produce hybrid works barely
recognizable from their constituents: Charlie Chaplin acting alongside
Tom Hanks; Enrico Caruso singing accompanied by Luciano Pavorotti;
Michael Jordan playing basketball with cartoon characters; a viewer
literally interacting with the movie he is watching. With this in mind,
one might argue that it is nothing short of absurd that on the precipice
of the twenty-first century, the legal test that we rely upon to determine
if one work infringes the copyright in another is to ask the average guy
right off the street whether one work reminds him of the other. Yet we
do. Moreover, extracting the protectable expression from the text is

55. Indeed, very different. "Substantial similarity" in the copying prong means only
enough similarity to raise an inference of copying. Yet in the other prong, it means
sufficient similarity so that an ordinary observer would regard aesthetic appeal of the two
the same. Denker v. Ukry, 820 F. Supp. 722, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Alan Latman,
"ProbativeSimilarity"as Proofof Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 1178, 1204 (1990)).
56. Latman, supra note 55, at 1204. The major treatise in the field has also embraced
that term. MELVILLE B. & DAviD NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 13.01[B), at 13-13,
13.03[AJ, at 13-29.
57. Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991); Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
58. Kretschmer v. Warner Bros., No. 93 CIV.1730 (CCH), 1994 WL 259814, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994) (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v.Fab-Lu, 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir.
1966)).
59. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F,2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

1998]

COPYRIGHT LAW

659

particularly important in contemporary literary works because (as we
shall see later) they consist largely, indeed overwhelmingly, of preexisting material. Hence, the ordinary observer must compare the two
works as if almost all of the original was "missing" and instead focus
only upon the plaintiff's original contribution.
No one is sure precisely which features of the text comprise the
elements of the copyright claim, so we ask the ordinary observer whether
he thinks the two are similar. However, before we hand the two works
over to him, a predicate determination has already been made: that the
defendant in fact derived his work from the plaintiff's.
F A Brief Digression: The Two Dominant but Competing
Theoretical Paradigmsof Copyright
There are two distinct rationales to justify protecting an author's
works by means of a property right." These two rationales are used
to justify the view that the only legitimate goal of intellectual property
law is to calibrate the incentive benefits of legal protection against the
deadweight loss of monopoly pricing versus the polar view that
ownership of rights in one's creative works are analogous to rights of the
person and therefore resistant to sterile economic analysis, which might
permit intrusion upon those rights if the author suffers no direct
economic harm.
The first of these two rationales is the romantic vision of the
independent creative genius, perhaps grounded in natural law, though
its etiology is probably more complicated."' This view compels the
conclusion that an author has a property right in what he created just
as if it were a parcel of land (though not, of course, necessarily in the
physical article but in the intangible expression). By contrast, the
second view is that copyright is merely an instrument of public policy
designed to encourage the creation of original works of authorship. It is
alternatively known as the "instrumentalist" justification or the ex ante
perspective. The latter rationale would support an easement across
another's property if it did not harm the property; the former, perhaps
not. Obviously, the scope of copyright protection is broader under the
first rationale than under the second. Under the second rationale, the
infringement standard is calibrated roughly according to the economic
incentives needed to encourage the author to create the work. More

60. These two competing rationales are examined together in several works. See, e.g.,
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:

THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM

GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15 (1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 140 (1993).
61. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 224 (KB. 1769).
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precisely: beginning with no protection whatsoever, what is the point at
which if the last increment of protectability were removed, the author's
incentives to create the work would be quashed or at least seriously
diminished?
Which of these two competing rationales of copyright is embodied in
modern copyright law? No doubt it is infused with both."2 And the
dominance of one over the other perhaps depends upon the subject
matter more than anything else. For instance, the infringement
standard by which databases and factual compilations are judged
reflects a hard-edged reality of minimal, incremental creativity driven
only by the prospect of commercial gain. Economics rather than
aesthetics controls this domain: the infringement standard is mechanically applied and looks only toward what the accused infringer took. By
contrast, the infringement standard applied to literary works is premised
on the notion of preserving the original author's aesthetic appeal, which
innervates the entire work rather than being embodied in one particular
element or another. Hence, the infringement standard asks whether an
"ordinary observer," after a leisurely-rather than critical-reading of
both works would regard their aesthetic appeal the same. The standard
applied to literary works seems to appreciate the work--or some
ephemeral part of it anyway-as the author's personal property. On the
other hand, the database standard seems to reflect an indifference
towards the author but also a recognition that the creation of original
(hence useful) products must not be discouraged by permitting unrestricted copying.

62. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). These commentators urge the infusion of natural law principles
into contemporary copyright doctrine. First, I do not think that anyone seriously doubts
that copyright law is premised in part upon natural law. On the other hand, these
principles by themselves are unable to support a workable body of doctrine--as evidenced
by the efforts of the two commentators recited above-and therefore have given way to a
market-based endpoint. Indeed, commentators such as Yen and Gordon who suggest that
we revisit natural law principles have not offered any workable scheme-nor, in fact, any
scheme at all-by which the coypright law should be so modified. Copyright law operates
through its statutory provisions and common law decisions, and therefore any viable
proposal for reform should fixate upon either or both of these rather than offering what
amounts to nothing more than precatory musings. For example, the following are about
as specific as these proposals get: 'The proper future construction of our copyright law
depends on the restoration of its natural law heritage," Yen, supra note 62, at 559; "[the]
natural rights approach... supports a demand that significant components of intellectual
property law be crafted to serve the public benefit," Gordon, supra note 62, at 1609.
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Moreover, the particular commercial setting may favor one justification over the other. For instance, the difficulty with calibrating an
infringement standard on economic incentives is that the threshold point
varies drastically according to medium and industry. Indeed, in many
industries there is arguably little need for copyright protection to compel
vigorous creation of original works of authorship, which, of course, is an
argument for narrow protection. For instance, in the software industry-an industry in which new products quickly become technically
obsolete-the lead time advantage enjoyed by the first entrant may be
sufficient incentive. Infringement of scholarly writing (by other scholars)
is enforced, no doubt, by numerous professional and quasi-professional
bodies whose sanctions can be far more severe than an infringement
verdict in the courts. According to one commentator: "Plagiarism is an
academic capital offense, punishable by academic death for student or
faculty."' Similarly, the film industry has a strict code that discourages stealing ideas from others in the industry."
The romantic conception, in contrast to the instrumentalist justification, unfortunately suggests no reliable endpoint to measure the proper
level of protection short of an absolute proscription of copying in any
manner. Thus, the instrumentalist justification generally supports an
infringement standard more tolerant of copying than the romantic
justification. Yet, a higher level of copyright protection rarely benefits
the author, who pays for that higher level of protection ex post in
increased cost of expression due to restricted access to others' works
upon which he must necessarily draw. By implication from the
preceding sentence, an author somehow benefits no matter where the
line is drawn as long as it is clearly drawn.
Hence, copyright law must strike a delicate balance between providing
incentives to authors in the form of legal protection against copying their
works and not squelching those incentives by so raising the level of
protection that future authors may not draw freely upon the stock of
prior works without fear of infringement. Hence, the balance is between
authors on one end and authors on the other: the same author who is
denied protectability of the ideas contained in his novel against an
accused infringer benefits ex post because he can borrow other authors'
ideas freely when creating his next work. Thus, his incentive to create,
though diminished by the narrow scope of protection in his own works,
is revived by a reduced cost of expression or cost of creating subsequent
works because he can borrow liberally from other works without fear of
infringing or obtaining a license. This is rare: often a legal rule

63. KR. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PIAGIARISM 39 (1988).
64. See, e.g., ROBERT KOSBERG, HOw TO SELL YOUR IDEA TO HOLLYWOOD 178 (1991).
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balances the interests of two different groups--debtors and creditors,
common carriers and passengers, businesses and consumers, public
corporations and private investors, and so forth. The significance of this
astonishingly simple paradigm is that beyond a certain point, increased
copyright protection will actually decrease authors' incentives to create
new works because curtailing access to the stock of available material
raises their cost of expression.65
So, viewed ex ante, authors, when viewed as an entire group, are by
and large indifferent to the scope of protection afforded their works.
Most authors and artists would disagree, of course, because they want
it both ways: whether an artist becomes incensed when he or she finds
out, for example, the film Defending Your Life is a substantial copy from
a prior novel, yet was held not to infringe, depends, for instance, upon
M a celebrity author or
whether the artist is a rocker or a rapper,"
M
My point is
biographer, 7 or a postmodern artist or impressionist."
that clearly some authors and artists are net borrowers while others are
net contributors, but in this section and in this Article, I am speaking
generally. So in an ideal world, legal protection in the form of copyright
would be carefully titrated so that the level of protection just exactly
matches the point at which one less unit of protection would substantially diminish the author's incentives to create the work; in other words, no

65. Thus, at least in copyright law anyway, the tension over where to draw the line
separating protectable from unprotectable matter is largely overstated. Indeed, I see it as
a pointless exercise. Shifting the standard in either direction simultaneously benefits
(viewed ex ante) and harms (viewed ex post) authors. So, within broad boundaries there
exists a spectrum of "correct" standards. Beyond that, determining the scope of protection
is a pure policy decision, not a legal or intellectual one. Although it is a policy decision,
one should not expect it to be made by policymakers (legislators). That is because
calibrating the desired scope of protection is confounded by the heterogeneity in the types
of works (novels, movies, biographies, sculptures, stuffed animals, and so on) and the types
of industry within which the works are created and disseminated. Hence, the legal rule
would have to take the form of highly specific regulations directed to one work or industry
at a time-which also implies that it may vary from medium to medium (e.g., one for
computer software, another for literary works, and so on).
66. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (the rap group "2 Live
Crew" created a parody of 50s rocker Roy Orbison's hit song "Oh, Pretty Woman").
67. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendant Random
House published a literary biography of plaintiffJ.D. Salinger and included quotations and
paraphrased text from the letters of Salinger; the court of appeals directed the lower court
to issue an injunction).
68. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (defendant-sculptor Koons created
a precise sculpture from a photograph taken by plaintiff. As part of Koons' "Banality
Show," Koons intended the sculpture to be an accurate depiction of the photograph for
purposes of social criticism in the tradition of Andy Warhol, Robert Rauschenberg, and
David Salle).
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more legal protection is given the author than is necessary. At least if
one accepts the instrumentalist justification of copyright over the
romantic conception, then copyright is not about helping the copyright
owner squeeze every last dime out of his property right. Instead, it is
about carefully calibrating the level of protection based on the necessary
incentives required to compel the author to create the work. Any
additional protection will diminish the incentives of future authors to
create because they must pay for that increased protection in the form
of higher costs of creation.
III.

PROPERTY RULES VERSUS LIABILITY RULES

The reader may wonder by now whether copyright is even a property
right at all. If the focus is market harm, why can it not be described
using traditional liability rules?
Though this is not a frivolous position, the view taken in this Article
is that copyright is best understood, heuristically at least, as a property
right-at least if one accepts the current orthodoxy on these matters.
According to this view, set forth in its original form by Calabresi and
Melamed nearly thirty years ago, the extent and nature of the transaction costs in a particular case dictate whether one of the parties to a
Coasian bargain ought to have an absolute property right (injunction) or
More specifically, property rules
simply a right to collect damages.'
are more appropriate when few parties are involved, when valuation of
the harm is difficult, and when all other transaction costs between the
parties are low. The clear consensus is that intellectual property
best protected, at least in part, by property rules--as indeed
regimes are
70
they are.
Yet the difference may be overstated. More recent scholarship, most
notably by Professor Polinsky, suggests that the real difference between
property rules and liability rules is quite often insignificant.7' Indeed,
copyrights are in fact protected by a combination of property rules and
liability rules. Injunctions are usually ordered when requested by the
prevailing copyright owner.72 Yet pure money damages are available
in addition to injunctive relief.78 Finally, the availability of statutory

69. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
'Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).

70. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2664 (1994).
71. Mitchell A. Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075, 1092 (1980).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
73. Id. § 504(b).
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damages, which the plaintiff may elect in the event that he is unable to
quantify his actual harm, suggests a recognition of the difficult
valuations inherent in copyright infringement and therefore evidences
a slight bias towards property rules.
In the sections that follow, I will present a detailed argument to
support the theory advanced in this Article.
IV. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS PROCEEDS WITHOUT AN
ANTECEDENT DEFINITION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT IN THE TEXT

A.

Introduction
If a copyright were a property right in relation to the text itself (or

more precisely in the expression embodied in the text itself), then at
some point, either during the registration process or later during the
infringement analysis, reasonably precise boundaries of the property
would have to be identified"' as it is, for instance, in patent law:
"Before analyzing a claim to determine whether infringement occurs, the
court must properly interpret the claim."75 Ideally, the original (hence
protectable) portions of the text would need to be segregated from the
rest of the work and then assayed through a series of filters (such as
scenes-a-faire and idea-expression dichotomy) to determine whether they
qualify for protection by copyright. Of course, this needs to be done
because copying from a prior work is not infringement unless what is
borrowed is, among other things, original. For instance, the theme of a
work of fiction may be original but is generally regarded by courts as too
abstract to be protectable. Of course, taking the entire sequence of
events from a prior novel is not infringement if the author of that novel
in turn borrowed the story from a newspaper account of actual events.
So if a copyright were a property right in relation to the text itself, then
this type of dissection would occur. Just as in a suit for trespass upon
land, the boundaries of the plaintiff's property, unless conceded, would
first need to be determined; the portions of the text that are actually
protected under the copyright would need to be identified. But, as we
shall see, no prior definition occurs.

74. Ownership of the copyright should not, of course, be confused with ownership of the
physical item embodying the protected expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994) (ownership
of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object).
75. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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B. The IntrinsicResistance of Literary Works to PreciseDefinition of
Copyright Scope
Today, it is fashionable to say that copyright law, like patent law, is
socially constructed. Hence, the essential elements of the legal test as
well as the procedural minutiae of each regime are merely artifacts of
cultural, bureaucratic, and other random, indeterminate forces that have
little or nothing to do with the intrinsic character of the thing sought to
be protected. "[Aidvances in production and reproduction make it
increasingly clear that the distinctions that seemed to be inherent in the
terms 'patent' and 'copyright' are in fact illusory because they fail to
capture anything that is significant about the products of human
intellect."76 The view taken in this Article is directly opposed to this
view.
Indeed, it appears that the difference between copyright and patent
law is due to genuine differences in the attributes of the property that
each regime is designed to protect. Though it is not crucial to the thesis
advanced in this Article, copyright law and patent law, each exclusive
domains for the property they protect, are different at an absolutely
primary level. Patent law is directed towards articles and methods that
are required to be "useful" whatever else they may be. That is, they are
functional and therefore can be described that way: "a method for
treating baldness," "a chemical compound for use in treating baldness
having the chemical formula X." In instances like these, the novelty
resides in an improved structure or method compared with existing
technology. In the case of novel devices or compounds, the property
right is readily described: "a computer having an input device, a
monitor, and a processor."
By contrast, copyright law expressly denies protection for property
Rather, copyright law
whose primary attributes are functional."
protects only aesthetic features. There is no requirement that they be
novel, nor need they traverse some aesthetic threshold-which is too
difficult to determine anyway. Copyright law requires only that the
work be "original'--a rudimentary threshold. Thus, while intellectual
property that is functional can be readily described using functional
language, aesthetic property resists accurate description by prose. For
instance, how might one describe the protectable elements of a novel?

76. RochelleCooperDreyfuss,A Wiseguy'sApproach to InformationProducts:Muscling
Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV.
195, 221-22.

77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also, e.g., Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d. Cir. 1985).
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Certainly the prose would be part of the claim and also, perhaps, the
detailed sequence of events, but the problems are these: what is the
level of abstraction above which we deny protection, and how do we
account for the complex reticulation of the story's different elements
(e.g., even if the main character is not protectable, does a protectable
element arise if combined with the remaining main characters?)? In
other words, copyright law cannot reliably draw a line to separate a
detailed description of the story's events (protectable) from a mere
outline of the plot (unprotectable), nor can copyright law force a
copyright owner to recite the "elements" of her text as though it were a
mechanical device because, for instance, most of these cannot be
disaggregated from one another.
The result is that a sufficient description of the scope of the copyright
claim, particularly in a literary text, is probably impossible. Even if it
is not impossible, then it is probably inefficient, which means the cost of
adequate description would outweigh the benefits of the additional
protection from a well-defined property right. Consider the case of a
poem. Beyond the literal language, very little is original or otherwise
protectable. So, how would the metes and bounds of that copyright
claim be described in an application or registration? Well, short of
reciting the entire poem itself on the application, there is no way to do
it. So that is precisely what copyright law requires-just a copy of the
actual text to accompany the registration certificate. It eschews an
inefficient description of an abstract claim to an aesthetic feature.
Rather, what it requires is a deposit copy of the physical article itself
(two actually, one for the Library of Congress) as part of the application
process. Beyond this, the actual process of registration requires only a
very cursory description of the material for classification purposes and
information for limiting the scope of copyright. For instance, if the work
is a derivative work, underlying material is not included within the
copyright, or if it is a compilation, the text itself may not be protected.
That is probably the best that we can do-to define the originalprotectable aspect of a work whose very purpose is quite often subversion of language itself. Consider this remark by Jeanette Winterston,
one of the finest living fiction writers:
It is a strange time; the writer is expected to be able to explain his or
her work as though it were a perplexing machine supplied without an
instruction manual. The question "What is your book about?" has
always puzzled me. It is about itself and if I could condense it into
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other
words I should not have taken such care to choose the words I
78
did.

Still though, could not an alternative scheme be constructed ab initio
so that the property right is sufficiently well defined to permit courts to
render an infringement judgment without relying upon copying? Not
likely. Again, copyright law exists to protect artistic endeavor whose
economic value is ostensibly its aesthetic appeal. Unfortunately, the
means to frame the boundaries of this type of property do not appear to
exist.
Consider once again patent law. There are three types of patents:
utility patents, design patents, and plant patents. Utility patents, which
account for the overwhelming majority of all patents, are, as discussed
earlier, directed to functional features. Design patents, on the other
hand, are directed to purely aesthetic features. Indeed, this type of
protection is a viable substitute for copyright protection for things like
fabric designs and ornamental aspects of building designs. If there is a
way to more precisely define the property right in an aesthetic feature-i.e., a mechanism to describe the scope beyond a single embodiment-then patent law, given its noteworthy history, would have found
it. Yet in this regard, it has failed. Indeed, the central principle of
design patent law is this: "Design patents have almost no scope. The
claim [of a design patent] is limited to what is shown in the application
drawings."79 As this principle implies-unlike utility patents that
describe the invention using abstractly worded claims that usually give
the patent owner a scope of protection far beyond any physical embodiment than he disclosed in his description--design patents contain no
claims in prose form to describe the property right; they contain only
drawings (usually just one). This results in a narrow scope of protection." This feature--common to both copyright and design patent law,
which are two regimes of disparate origin-suggests an integral
restriction to accurate description of the property right in artistic
endeavor rather than a shortcoming of the particular legal regime.
Yet, this inherent resistance to precise definition of the ostensible
property right in the text is, quite ironically, exacerbated by an
especially compelling need to provide a precise definition of the scope
because very little of any literary work is actually original and thus

78. Jeanette Winterson, A Work of My Own, in ART OBJECTS 165 (Vintage 1995).

79. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
80. Moreover, design patent law, like copyright'law, relies upon the "ordinary observer"
to determine whether the two articles are similar with respect to the novel feature claimed
in the patent. See, e.g., Oakley, Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).

668

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

protectable by copyright. Think of it this way: a particular element
(theme, style, plot, sequence of events, characters) from a literary text
copied by an accused infringer is very likely to be unprotectable because
among other things, it was in turn borrowed from a prior work. In
response, second-best approximating devices that will be discussed next
have evolved to provide this determination. But for now, the crucial
point is that these devices are not to be confused with an actual
separation of the original portions from the rest of the text.
C. The Idea/ExpressionDichotomy
Even though no reliable means exist to separate original from
unoriginal expression, decisions regarding protectability must still be
made-often element by element. Generally, the accused infringer will
argue that even if he did copy, what he copied was not protectable
expression. If one looks at enough infringement disputes involving
fiction works, one will find that the primary filter used to do this is the
idea/expression concept, which simply stated is this: copyright does not
protect ideas but only the expression of those ideas. Though this is
copyright law's most time-honored ritual incantation, the phrase "idea
versus expression" is at best an unfortunate linguistic choice that has
proliferated for years in copyright case law without genuine reflection
over its meaning; at worst, it is a tedious substitute for genuine analysis
of whether protectable elements from the original work have been
incorporated into the accused work. To paraphrase Benjamin Cardozo,
the idea/expression standard is simply "[a] generality [that] does not
carry us far upon the road to truth."s ' Put still another way: it is not
a "test" but a conclusion without supporting premises, yet it is often
"applied" tautologically as though it were a test ("copyright law does not
protect ideas only expression, this [element] is an idea, therefore it is
unprotectable."). Still, because this is by far the most important doctrine
by which protectable subject matter is separated from unprotectable
subject matter, it deserves discussion in this Article.
The idea/expression filter is very old."2 Writing during a time
characterized by a far different creative ethos than today (more on this
later), William Blackstone, writing in 1761 in Tonson v. Collins,'
stated that "[sityle and sentiment" rather than ideas were "the essentials

81.
82.

BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921).
At least one scholar has found an oblique reference to it in Blackstone's
Commentaries. See ROSE, supra note 60, at 132 (citing 2 W. BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 406 (1769)).

83. 1 Black W 301, 96 Eng. Rep. 169 (1761).
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of a literary composition."84 A journalist writing in 1763 agreed, "[The

protectable aspect of a book] consists chiefly in the form and composition: at least, this being all that can be in any good degree ascertained,
it is all the property capable of being legally secured."a Therefore, the
idea/expression dichotomy was recognizable virtually in its present-day
form as early as 1761. The earliest American reference to it, of any
consequence anyway, is in Baker v. Seldon," a famous copyright case
decided by the Supreme Court in 1879. Early copyright decisions under
the Statute of Anne confined the scope of copyright to reach hardly
beyond the verbatim text.17 Thus, in the first half of the eighteenth
century, a translation and an abridgment were regarded as new work
M
In the nineteenth century,
(they did not infringe the original)."
English and U.S. decisions expanded the scope of protection as the
emphasis shifted to the abstract concept of a "work." This is evidenced
by Drone on Copyright (the leading treatise on copyright law during this
period), which defined work as the "[elssence and value of a literary
composition" not limited to the literal language of the text.89 As the
scope of protection expanded, a filter was needed to separate protectable
from unprotectable expression. Put another way, once proscribed
copying was extended beyond just verbatim taking of the author's prose,
the question became which elements of another's work could be
permissibly copied.
Numerous justifications have been offered in support of the
idea/expression dichotomy. Richard Posner and William Landes have
shown by a formal model that protecting ideas would result in a net
decrease in creative output because authors' cost of expression would
increase." They also suggest that it is pareto optimal: it is the rule
that authors would prefer ex ante."1 Other explanations include the
suggestion that the cost of "discovering" new ideas is low compared to
creating expression; hence, ideas need not be protected to compel their
creation. Likewise, the high administrative cost of protecting ideas is no

84. Id. at 189.
85. Review of A Vindication ofthe Exclusive Rights ofAuthors to Their Own Works: A
Subject Now Under ConsiderationBefore the Twelve Judges ofEngland, 27 MoNTHLY REv.
176, 189 (1763).
86. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
87. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 60, at 133.
88. Burnett v. Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441, 35 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009 (1720); Gyles v. Wilcox,
2 Atk. 141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (1740).
89. EATON DRONE, DRONE ON COPYRIGHT (1879).
90. Landes & Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of CopyrightLaw, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
347-48 (1989).
91. Id.
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doubt important; it is simply too difficult to determine an idea's source
(whether it is original or not).'
I suggest that the purpose of the idea/expression standard is that it is
used as a proxy for the virtually intractable originality determination.
But why is a doctrine that goes by the label "idea/expression" used to
separate original from unoriginal expression? What follows is one
response to this question.
The properly crafted intellectual property law strikes a fragile balance
between ensuring that the law affords sufficient protection for original
creations and not providing too much protection so that a creator's
incentives to create are diminished by raising his cost of expression due
to overly restricted access to the protected works that he must necessarily draw upon to create new works. Again, the conflict of interest here
is not really between authors (producers) and readers (consumers) but
between authors and authors. There probably is no optimal scope of
protection. Within a range of possible choices, where to draw the line is
purely a policy choice, not an intellectual one. Indeed, it is not even
possible to conduct a rational debate over where to draw the line
separating protectable from unprotectable creation without a reference
point. Consider copyright law in light of its sister doctrine, the patent
law, which is far more developed in virtually every aspect. Under patent
law an inventor must conduct a thorough search for prior inventions
that may bear on the patentability of his own invention. Strictly

92. The "merger" and "scenes-a-faire" doctrines are closely related to the
idea/expression doctrine. The former is a frequently invoked doctrine in copyright law,
generally subsumed under the idea/expression concept and referring to instances in which
there are a very limited number of ways to express the idea. When that occurs, the merger
doctrine will often be invoked to render the expression unprotectable: "(An expression will
be found to be merged into the idea when 'there are no or few other ways of expressing a
particular ideal.'" Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Apple Computer; Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983)). Hence, the merger doctrine has been applied to deny protection to mathematics
questions in a college entrance exam, Educational Testing Servs., 793 F.2d at 40, and a
series of tables presenting awards in medical malpractice cases, Matthew Bender & Co. v.
Kiuwer Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), but not to a
numbering system for replacement parts, Toro Co. v. R&R Prods.Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1986), or to a system for recording medical laboratory tests, Norton Printing Co. v.
Augustana Hoop., 155 USPQ 133 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The scenes-a-faire doctrine is a sweeping
doctrine that is frequently relied upon, indeed over-relied upon in my opinion, in literary
works cases. The way it works is this: scenes-a-faire is generally defined as stock scenes
that inevitably flow from a particular concept, genre, theme, or other-for instance, a story
about life in a South Bronx police station is likely to feature a hard-drinking and cynical
but dedicated Irish cop-so that particular character, at that level of abstraction, is deemed
unprotectable by scenes-a-faire. The reader can, of course, see that the more broadly one
defines a work's theme, the more expression is subsumed under it.

19981

COPYRIGHT LAW

speaking, this is not an affirmative duty to search; but it might as well
be because the patent examiner, upon receiving his application,
immediately conducts his own search. The search of the "prior art"
encompasses not only prior patents (U.S. and foreign) but also academic
literature, marketing literature, and so forth, which means the search
can be quite expensive. In my own experience, it often is expensive
compared with the remaining cost of prosecuting the application and
even with the cost of invention. This search cost raises the inventor's
cost of expression and thus decreases his incentives to create. On the
other hand, because the boundaries of the existing state of the art are
reasonably well defined, the inventor gets to claim his invention with
maximum breadth-the claims comprising his patent can extend right
up to these boundaries." Therefore, the negative effect of the search
"requirement" (raising the inventor's de facto cost of invention) is offset
by this positive benefit: a well-established frontier of the state of the
art, comprised of previously patented inventions and those in the public
domain, which in essence defines the scope of the inventor's patent. In
turn this means that the inventor's patent can be as broad as possible:
he can get legal protection for his invention that extends right up to the
prior art frontier.
Copyright law is in drastic contrast. Searching the "prior art"--even
if searches were limited to works registered with the U.S. Copyright
Office, which they are not-is virtually impossible for many reasons, not
the least of which is that copyright registration certificates (unlike an
issued patent) do not adequately describe the claimed work so that the
works themselves would have to be searched manually. Even if that
were possible-which it is not-it would still leave the virtually infinite
sea of texts in the public domain. Not surprisingly then, no search is
required of the copyright applicant. Nor does the copyright examiner
conduct his own search. Moreover, the examination of a copyright
application, unlike the rigorous battle to obtain a patent, is virtually pro
forma, which means that the Office does not really pass on the issue of
originality even though it is a requirement for copyrightability. Instead,
it is left entirely for the courts. So the author's costs of creation do not
include this search cost. With only negligible search costs, the author's

93. This is true in practice not just in theory. In practice the inventor's attorney files
the application, which is comprised of claims that are almost always broader than the prior
art will allow. The examiner will therefore object to them, but always by reference to
particular pieces of prior art. This rejection is followed by amendments that narrow the
claims. Hence, the effect of this back-and-forth process is patent claims whose scope is
essentially defined by the prior art-where the existing state of the art leaves off, the
inventor's claims begin.
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cost of expression is lower; therefore, his incentives to create are higher
than otherwise.
However, there is a downside. Incentives are, of course, affected by
the breadth of the legal monopoly granted the author. In the case of
patents, the breadth of the inventor's grant is as broad as allowable in
light of the prior art. In the case of copyrights, neither the author nor
the Copyright Office nor the judge presiding over the infringement
dispute has the slightest clue about what is original (and hence
protectable) about the author's work. That is because the relevant "prior
art" cannot be identified-the inevitably vast corpus of prior literary
works of similar subject matter, theme, or genre.
Recall that in the case of patents, the prior art (negatively) defines the
scope of the property right just like real property lots that bind each
other on all four sides define the boundaries of the others. Yet in
copyrights, the prior art is essentially unknown; hence, the frontier of
original expression is undefined. So in the case of copyright, how is the
scope of protection defined? There is really no way to do it. Indeed, one
theme of this Article is that the entire copyright infringement analysis
is designed to avoid as much as possible the predicate question of scope
and instead to proceed directly to infringement (or perhaps more
precisely, it blends the two inquiries into one).
So because it cannot be determined the best way-by reference to the
prior art-a number of second-best devices have evolved, one of which
is the idea/expression dichotomy (other lesser examples: "merger" and
"scenes-a-faire" doctrines). These doctrines do nothing more than draw
purely arbitrary lines ostensibly to separate "original" from "unoriginal"
expression.. These doctrines evolved to limit the scope of the copyright
from encroaching on the prior art, hence avoiding overlapping copyright
claims granting property rights in material formerly in the public
domain. Therefore, the effect of these second-best approximating devices
is to scale back the property right well before it reaches the original/unoriginal frontier. Courts are sometimes more candid relying upon
their own judgment to draw the idea/expression boundary than at other
times. Consider HerbertRosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian," a case
involving a pin in the shape of a bee intended to be worn on a jacket
lapel:
What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner's
monopoly-from how large an area of activity did Congress intend to
allow the copyright owner to exclude others? We think the production
ofjeweled bee pins is a larger private preserve than Congress intended

94. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
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to be set aside in the public market without a patent. A jeweled bee
pin is therefore an "idea" that defendants were free to copy."
I suspect that this identical reasoning underlies many copyright
decisions relying upon the idea/expression dichotomy.
In summary, the idea/expression doctrine quite correctly gives the
benefit of the doubt to prior authors and subsequent authors and the
reading public-not to the author whose claim is under consideration.
Therefore, the idea/expression is a coarse proxy for the virtually
intractable question of which elements are original, and thus subsumed
within the copyright and which elements are not.
The remainder of this section is directed to persuading the reader
that, as a practical matter, the boundaries of the protectable (original)
portions of a copyrighted text are never determined during registration
or later in litigation.
D.

RegistrationPractice

The examination of a copyright application, unlike the rigorous battle
to obtain a patent, is virtually pro forma, which means that the Office
does not really pass on the issue of originality even though it is a
requirement for copyrightability. This issue is left entirely for the
courts. Courts are well aware of this, if not its consequences: "[Uinlike
a patent claim, a claim to copyright is not examined for basic validity
before a certificate issued."'
It is undisputed that the Copyright Office has neither the facilities nor
the authority to rule upon the factual basis of applications for registration or renewal, and that where an application is fair upon its face, the
Office cannot refuse to perform the "ministerial duty" of registration
"imposed upon [it] by the law.' 9
"There is no such [patent type] search or examination when a copyright
is secured. It issues almost automatically and there is no prior art to
contend with.' g8 So not only is a copyright registered ex parte, but
there is virtually no check on the breadth of the applicant's claim. Even
if that were possible-which it is not-it would still leave the virtually
infinite sea of texts in the public domain. Not surprisingly then, no

95. Id. at 742.
96. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 143 (D.N.J. 1982)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773).
97. Cadence Indus. Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F. Supp. 59, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations
omitted).

98. Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
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search is required of the copyright applicant, nor is one performed by the
Copyright Office examiner.
E. The Courts
1.
The Ideal Scenario. So originality/protectability is not
determined during the registration process. That leaves the matter to
the courts. Or does it? Consider first, Kregos v. Associated Press." In
Kregos the plaintiff had developed a form or chart to present baseball
statistics on baseball pitchers. The chart included certain categories of
statistics for each game's probable starting pitchers including their wonloss records, earned-run averages ("ERA"), and number of innings
pitched against particular opponents. Defendant Associated Press ("AP")
developed its own chart to display baseball statistics. Kregos sued AP
for copyright infringement."° The court noticed initially that Kregos's
form differed from the AP form in three respects. First, the AP form
included two statistics not found in Kregos's form. Second (and third),
Kregos's form included a set of statistics on the pitcher versus that day's
team at that ball park ("vs opp at site"). The AP form did not have that
statistic; instead it compiled those statistics into a slightly broader
category ("vs opp"). In sum, of the ten performance statistics compiled
in the AP form, five were different from those in Kregos's form. 1 ' The
court then posed the question, whether fifty percent identity equated to
"substantial similarity" and thus infringement. 2 What is interesting
about this opinion is that the court temporarily put that question to one
side to first determine the breadth of Kregos's copyright. In other words,
the court sought first to determine precisely what about Kregos's form
was original and therefore protectable. To do this the court first
observed that no single pitching form prior to Kregos's form contained
more than three of the nine categories of pitching statistics included in
the Kregos form."8 It also noted that most of the statistical categories
in Kregos's form already existed in one form or another at the time
Kregos created his form.'
More specifically, the Kregos form contained six categories of statistics not found in earlier forms; five of these
existed in the AP form. More specifically still, these six original
categories of statistics all related to the single set of statistics described

99, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
100. I& at 1328.
101. Id. at 1332.

102. rd. at 1333.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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by the heading "vs opp at site," that is, how that day's pitcher historicalThe court next
ly performed against that team at that ballpark.'
found that this set of statistics was precisely the set of statistics that AP
changed; therefore, the court concluded that AP was not guilty of
infringement because it had not copied any protectable expression from
Kregos regardless of whatever else it had copied." e Put another way,
none of the material copied by AP from the Kregos form was original to
Kregos; therefore, it was not copyrightable: "The balance we strike in
this case... protects defendants against an infringement claim when
the differences between their form and the plaintiff's pitching form
involve the very elements that made the Kregos form copyrightable."0 7
The lesson from this case is clear: the court was saved from a virtual
stalemate over whether a fifty percent similarity constituted an
infringement by performing a predicate determination of the scope of the
plaintiff's copyright. The court was able to determine that none of the
plaintiff's protectable expression was copied by defendant. This in
essence precluded the infringement analysis altogether.
Kregos is an ideal copyright infringement case because the court began
by defining the scope of plaintiffs copyright (how much of it was
original, hence protectable) before proceeding to the question of whether
the two works were substantially similar. In reality though, copyright
infringement disputes rarely proceed that way because they cannot,
particularly in the case of literary works of fiction.
2. The Literary Exemplar. Despite the case just discussed,
separation of the copyrighted text into original and nonoriginal portions
is not an inquiry into which courts normally engage. Consider Denker
v. Uhry. 08
Several years ago, the film Driving Miss Daisy was released to the
public and received critical as well as popular acclaim. As the reader
may recall, this movie told the story of an elderly white Jewish person
who, faced with advancing age and the consequent loss of independence,
enlisted the assistance of an African-American helper (chauffeur). The
relationship was initially tenuous, strained by the employer's deeply held
attitudes and beliefs about race and social class. Yet the relationship
metamorphosed from that of employer-employee to a devoted friendship
and thereby depicted the erosion of firmly entrenched racial barriers.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1334.
107. Id
108. 820 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Such an erosion occurs largely through the patient mentorship of the
servant towards the master.'"
A few years before, a different author wrote a novel, Horowitz and
Mrs. Washington, which also told the story of an elderly white Jewish
person who, faced with advancing age and the consequent loss of
independence, also reluctantly enlisted the assistance of an AfricanAmerican helper (physical therapist). This relationship, after a chilly
beginning, also developed into a warm and lasting friendship and
chronicled a triumph over racism."' The novel, like the film, relied
upon the servant to deliver the message to the recalcitrant master of the
irrelevance of race in basic aspects of human experience and value. In
both novel and film, the master represented the archetype of the
depression-era Jew whose attitudes toward other races, particularly
African-Americans, were deeply and ubiquitously imbedded by early
childhood from both parents and society at large. The main characters
in both were highly similar.
Additionally, several discrete events are found in both the movie and
the prior novel: a scene involving the master's son's frustrating attempts
to persuade the master of the desperate need for a helper due to the
master's advancing age and consequent disability; the master vehemently denying the need for assistance, particularly from an AfricanAmerican person, even though the master currently employed an
African-American housekeeper, who the master obliquely told the son
was an "exception." Also, the servant in both the novel and film
dutifully reported to work in one scene under adverse weather conditions, a scene intended to depict intense devotion to the master. In both
novel and film, the growing admiration and respect by the master
toward the servant was illustrated by the master's assistance in a
difficult problem faced by the servant-helping the servant's son in legal
trouble (Horowitz) and teaching the servant to read (Driving Miss
Daisy). In both, the friendship was catalyzed by the master's loneliness
caused by the recent death of her spouse. In both, the servant frequently and graciously keeps the master company."'
After the film was released, the author of Horowitz sued, among
others, the studio that produced Driving Miss Daisy, alleging that the
latter infringed the copyright in his novel. The screenwriter of Driving
Miss Daisy conceded that he had read the play and that he had copied
from it."2 Despite this, the court, on summary judgment no less, held

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 724-28.
Id. at 723-24.
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Miss Daisy did not infringe Horowitz and Mrs. Washingthat1 Driving
3
ton.

To arrive at this result, the court did not bother to determine the
protectable scope of Denker's text (what were the original/copyrightable
elements), which is what the court in Kregos did; the word originality
was not mentioned once in the Denker opinion. Yet the court in Denker
did in fact determine the scope of protection in something, but it was not
the text. Protectable material was not separated from unprotectable
material based on originality; indeed, not one prior work was mentioned
in the court opinion.1 4

I suggest that courts do not engage in this

inquiry because it is simply intractable."'
The ordinary observer in the Driving Miss Daisy case-asked to
determine whether the film appears to be derived from the novel-might
quite credibly believe the complex and protean relationship between
Miss Daisy and Hoke (master and servant) to be the essence of the
novel. Perhaps it is. But that particular "idea" and its general
expression is hardly original. Of course, no preexisting work of fiction
is identical to it at the very lowest level of abstraction. Nevertheless,
the presence of so many literary antecedents means that the scope of
protection in Driving Miss Daisy is quite narrow. In other words,
because his copyright obviously does not extend to cover preexisting
works, those works, in essence, define the scope of his copyright.
The master-servant theme indeed has a venerable literary tradition.
It has been refined through literary masterpieces such as Cervantes's
Don Quixote, Twain's Huckleberry Finn, Smollett's Roderick Random,
Fielding's Joseph Andrews, Dierdot's Jacques the Fatalist,and Dickens'
Pickwick Papers. Elements from each of these works can be found in the
work-in-suit (plaintiff's work, Horowitz and Mrs. Washington) in the
Driving Miss Daisy case referred to earlier. For instance, the transformation of the formal employer-employee relationship into a genuine
friendship (the dissolution of the master-servant relationship) and the
quasi-paternalistic tenor of the relationship (servant towards the master)
that comprise a large part of the aesthetic appeal in Horowitz are also
major themes in The Pickwick Papers and Huckleberry Finn. Nor is the
113. Id. at 736.
114. Id. Instead, the court relied upon the discrete and comprehensive dissimilarities
between the two works and, to a far lesser extent, the idea/expression dichotomy and the
scenes-a-faire and merger doctrines to determine the scope of protection.
115. Therefore, I find the proposals for copyright reform offered in the literature
suggesting that courts "ought to determine whether this taken thing was itself taken by
the plaintiff from the cultural tradition known to those in the field. . ." too vague to be of
any use. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
119, 184 (1991).
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treatment in Horowitz of the servant as a true equal-perhaps even a
superior who educates the master-an original variation of the masterservant theme, having been previously explored in Jacques the Fatalist.
Nevertheless, none of this appeared in the Denker opinion. Indeed,
originality was not once mentioned; rather, protection was denied on
idea/expression, scenes-a-faire, merger, and extent-of-dissimilar-element
grounds.
An ideal infringement analysis would, of course, consider all of these
works in defining the scope of Denker's copyright claim before deciding
infringement. Yet that is obviously intractable, which explains why it
was not done in this case, nor is it ever done in disputes involving
literary works. This should convince the reader that something other
than a property right in relation to a text is being protected by
copyright.
F A Brief Digression: Other Commentators'Efforts
If the reader accepts my thesis-that the boundary separating original
from unoriginal subject matter is too difficult in most instances to be
reliably drawn-then several proposals offered in the literature for
reform of copyright law must be immediately rejected. I shall discuss
the most recent and pervasive of these below.
In the past decade, a cluster of articles has appeared that generally
offers some sort of proposal to reform copyright, motivated by the stale
insight that both patent law and copyright law protect intangible
property. Therefore, these commentators argue, a patent law doctrine
or two should be transplanted into copyright law to repair the latter. In
other instances the commentators call for outright fusion of the two
bodies of law or, still more extreme, for outright replacement of copyright
doctrines for their patent counterparts.
The purpose of the previous section was to show that a property right
in relation to a text would be problematic because of the extraordinary
difficulty in separating original from unoriginal expression. I have
argued in this Article that the difficulty appears to be an intrinsic
attribute of texts-or the thing that copyright must protect-rather than
a superficial flaw in the copyright law. Furthermore, this Article showed
that neither the Copyright Office nor the courts in litigation engage in
this determination. Instead, courts have developed approximating
devices, most notably the idea-expression doctrine, to estimate where the
prior art frontier lies. The conclusion drawn from this is that copyright
law-both in theory and in practice-is poorly suited to define a property
right in relation to a text. Rather than offering the conclusion that a
copyright is a poorly defined property right in relation to a text, I have
relied on that as a premise to show that a copyright is not a property
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right in relation to a text at all but is a property right in relation to a
legally structured market position. Therefore, I reject the syncretic
approaches of these commentators whose work I shall discuss below.
Professor Lemley has argued that copyright law is "more hostile to
improvements than is patent law.""' By "improvements" he means
related works that borrow from a prior work though this term is
ambiguous and problematic when applied to copyright law. For one
thing, it is borrowed from patent law; there, an "improvement" has a
sensible benchmark-the device performs the function more cheaply,
reliably, and accurately than the prior device. Put another way, an
"improved" device or method has a clear meaning because a patent is
directed to a functional endpoint rather than an aesthetic one-i.e., an
improved device is one that performs its intended function somehow
"better" than prior ones. I am not sure what it would mean to "improve"
upon a work of literature, unless he means new works recast in different
media (for example, novel to film), though in that case how can the film
be said to be an "improvement?" In any event, Lemley then argues that
the best way to fix copyright law is to make it more like patent law-in
this instance, to amend the law to provide for "blocking copyrights."117
A "blocking patent" is best characterized as a property right within a
property right. 1 The concept embodied in the term is confusing
1 n9
because it has no analogue to a concept found in tangible property.
For instance, suppose Smith has a patent covering compound X; he
discloses its use as a fertilizer. While the Smith patent is still in term,
Jones discovers that compound X is also an effective anti-tumor agent-a
use of which Smith was not aware. Can Jones patent the new use? Yes,
and that type of patent is known as a blocking patent because it blocks
Smith from selling compound X for use in treating cancer and because
Y cannot sell X without infringing Smith's original patent. So,
heuristically, the Jones patent can be thought of as a property right
existing within Smith's-like a hole in a doughnut. Though it may not
be obvious in this context, what makes the tight juxtaposition of these
competing rights possible is that they are well-defined property rights.
As this Article has argued, literary texts are ill-defined with respect to

116. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in IntellectualProperty Law, 75
TX. L. REV. 989, 1029 (1997).
117. Id. at 1069.
118. Id.
119. Perhaps it does. Suppose a landowner owned a piece of land completely encircled
by land owned by another. In that case though he would have the right to exclude the
second landowner from his little island of property, the first landowner would not have the
right, without an easement, to leave his property (and therefore, commercially exploit it).
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their original and unoriginal elements. Yet blocking copyrights require
precise boundaries to squeeze the blocking property right within the
interstices of the prior right. It will not work for traditional copyrightable subject matter, and I suspect that nearly every copyright practitioner already knows this.
Finally, I disagree with Professor Lemley's premise that copyright is
more hostile to improvers than is patent law. He infers this premise
from the absence of a system of blocking copyrights, which is where I
assume he got his solution to reform copyright law. There is a reason
copyright law does not recognize blocking copyrights;, they would not
work. No one could define this right with sufficient precision to have
any legal meaning. Instead, copyright law has its own mechanisms for
protecting or immunizing the work of improvers of which Professor
Lemley apparently was not aware. Again, the ordinary observer will
excuse an accused text if he does not recognize it as having been derived
from the first even though the accused text contains protectable
expression taken from the first text. This habitually occurs, for instance,
in film-adaptation disputes.12 The ordinary observer fails to recognize
the accused novel's essential features embodied in the film and excuses
the copying. Indeed, perhaps this is as close to definition of an
"aesthetic improvement" as we can get:' a text that the ordinary
observer does not recognize as having been derived from the original text
even though the accused text embodies elements from the original text.
Of course, if we accept this definition, then copyright law is anything but
hostile to improvers but indeed immunizes them from infringement
although they borrowed protectable expression from a prior text.
Professor Wiley's proposal is more drastic and appears to require no
less than a complete replacement of copyright law's essential machinery
by doctrines borrowed from patent law.12' This proposal is not tractable for the same reasons that Professor Lemley's was not. A copyright,
regardless of how one characterizes it, does not confer a well-defined
property right in a text but confers a poorly defined one at best.
Additionally, while it is true that both patent and copyright protect
novel intellectual creations, it is easy to overstate this similarity. As
this Article has argued above, an aesthetic creation and a functional one
are completely different creatures. Indeed, the copyright law makes sure
of that: it expressly denies protection for any functional features of an
article.'2 2 Also, the rigid orthodoxy of patent claim language does not

allow for description of the aesthetic features of a device. Therefore, a

120. See Y'Barbo, supra note 9, at 304.
121. Wiley, supra note 115, at 119.

122. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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proposal to transplant patent laws' venerable body of law on the
patentability standard (based on novelty and nonobviousness) to
copyright law is difficult to take seriously.
V. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IS PREMISED UPON COPYING BY THE
ACCUSED INFRINGER
The Copyright Code defines a copyright claim as though it were a
property right in relation to a text. The Copyright Statute expressly
enumerates rights over which the copyright owner has exclusive
dominion and later defines the unauthorized exercise of those rights as
"infringement.""m2 Yet the genuine test of whether intangible property
possesses the attributes of property depends upon whether the property
owner has the absolute right to exclude all others (i.e., is it an enforceable right, and against whom) and whether the owner has the right to
exercise complete control over his or her property. Therefore, a regime
based on the grant of property rights should condemn any, or almost
any, unauthorized exercise of those exclusive rights as an improper
intrusion upon the copyright owner's property, against anyone. Yet
copyright does not, which raises the question: From what does the
copyright owner have the right to exclude an infringer? As we shall see
in this section, this right is severely limited based on the method by
which the accused infringer prepared his text."2
In this next section, it is argued that liability for copyright infringement is premised on the method by which the accused infringer created
his or her text rather than on the amount of protectable expression
common to both texts. Put another way: if the accused infringer's text
is identical to a prior one, it still does not infringe the prior text unless
the accused text was derived from the prior text. This is not just an
affirmative defense to a charge of infringement but the chief component
of the plaintiff's prima facie case. This principle is virtually impossible
to reconcile with a regime granting a property right in expression
embodied in a text.
Consider the test for patent infringement: "To establish infringement,
every limitation set forth in a patent claim must be found in an accused
product or process .

..

."'2

This is a sterile, highly analytical process

that requires painstaking dissection of the terms comprising the claims
in the patent. By contrast, consider a few exemplary formulations of the

123. Id. §§ 106, 501(a).
124. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 116, at 1014 ("[Clopyright infringement cases
frequently focus on the defendant's actions and intentions in preparing the accused work").
125. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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copyright infringement standard: "[Infringement does not] necessarily
depend on the quantity taken [but also on the] value of the materials
taken. [Infringement may exist] 'if so much is taken, that... the labors
of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent
appropriated by another ...

.

"Taking what is in essence the

heart of the work is considered a taking of a substantial nature, even if
what is actually taken is less than extensive." 2 ' "Appropriation of the
fruits of another's labor and skill in order to publish a rival work
without the expenditure of the time and effort required for the independently arrived at result is copyright infringement." 2 ' Finally, from
Arnstein v. Porter,12 perhaps the most important decision in copyright
law: "The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's
works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of the lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff."13 These excerpts illustrate that (1) copyright infringement
is premised on the method by which the accused infringer prepared his
or her work rather than on the amount of protectable material copied,
and (2) the analysis rapidly distills to a fundamental matter of fairness.
Indeed, the copyright infringement test appears to have always been
this way. A review of the nineteenth century copyright cases reveals an
unmistakable fixation upon copying, which is offered to corroborate the
conclusion presented in the previous section that the method by which
the accused infringer created his or her work, not the quantitative
measure of the material taken, is the center of gravity of the infringement analysis. Consider how one court in 1845 phrased the infringement test: "[Tihe real question on this point, is, not whether such
resemblances exists, but whether these resemblances are purely
accidental and undesigned, and unborrowed, because arising from
common sources accessible to both the authors ...

."I'

A few years

later in 1858, another court, relying upon the leading copyright treatise,
framed the infringement test this way:
[T]he main question is, whether the author of the work alleged to be
a piracy has resorted to the original sources alike open to him and to

all writers, or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the work

126. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
127. WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D.D.C. 1984).
128. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686,690 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).

129. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
130. Id. at 473.
131. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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which it is alleged he has infringed, without resorting to the other
sources from which he had a right to borrow. 8 2
Finally, at about that same time (1862), a federal court in Ohio posed
the question essentially the same way:
[Tihe true inquiry undoubtedly is, not whether the one is the facsimile
of the other, but whether there is such a substantial identity as fairly
to justify the inference that in getting up the guide, Mrs. Ewing has
availed herself of Mrs. Drury's chart and has borrowed from it its
essential characteristics.'3
So, compared with patent law and trademark law, the most distinctive
feature of copyright law is that the copyright infringement plaintiff must
affirmatively disprove independent creation by the accused infringer.
This is a more crucial prong of the infringement test than it first
appears to be. We shall put to one side the question of precisely why the
copyright plaintiff must do so when, for instance, the patent plaintiff
must not. For now, consider the following example. Suppose that
during an archaeological excavation of a tomb of unknown origin near
Cairo, Egypt, a highly regarded egyptologist discovers an ancient
dramatic play written on tablets found within the tomb. The play,
written over 5,500 years ago in an obscure hieroglyphic-like dialect not
previously translatable, represents a find of unprecedented significance
to the field of egyptology and, indeed, to the public-at-large. The
egyptologist who unearthed the play, after several years of extraordinary
effort, successfully translates the play. She then promptly publishes the
play in her native language, which is Chinese. Photographs of the pages
of hieroglyphic symbols are prepared and made available by the internet
from the library at Cairo. The translation of the play is both a premiere
scholarly achievement and a huge commercial success.
A year or so later, an American translates the play into English. He
publishes it in the U.S. and other English-speaking countries in advance
of the Chinese egyptologist's version, which has not yet been translated
into English even though plans were currently being made to do so given
the important commercial markets that English-speaking countries
represent. The American's version also becomes a huge commercial
success. Is the American guilty of copyright infringement?
The question, as it is in all copyright infringement cases, is this: Are
the two texts substantially similar with respect to only the original
work's protectable expression? If so, the American infringes subject to

132.

Greene v. Bishop, 10 F.

Cas.

1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763).

133. Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.O. Ohio 1862) (No. 4095). See also,
e.g., Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.).
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the important proviso that if the American created his work independently and without copying from the egyptologist's work, then he is not
an infringer regardless of the similarity between the two works.
Obviously then, the difficulty lies partially in identifying the
protectable expression that comprises the egyptologist's work (i.e.,
precisely what portions of the work represent his contribution). Consider
just how difficult that will be in this instance. The work of the
egyptologist is, of course, itself a "copy," or a derivative work of a prior
text in the public domain. The defendant, of course, contends that his
work is also a translation of the same public domain text and not of the
egyptologist's work. Therefore, he argues, some similarity, perhaps most
of the similarity, is inevitable. Indeed, the egyptologist's copyright only
protects his original contribution, and there is really no way to
determine what that is. Thus, determining the scope of the egyptologist's copyright is a difficult task.
But even before we get to the question of whether the two works are
substantially similar, the egyptologist must traverse the first prong of
the infringement test: that the defendant copied from the egyptologist's
text. Regardless of the similarity of the two works, if the American sat
down at his desk and created the translation using oly the photographs
of the hieroglyphic pages, he has not infringed. On the other hand, if he
had in front of him and relied upon both the hieroglyphics pages and the
egyptologist's Chinese translation-that is, if his own work is derived
from the plaintiff's-then he is (depending upon how much he took) an
infringer.
So, the egyptologist must prove that the American defendant copied
at least partially from the egyptologist's work while the American
prepared his translation. As a practical matter, consider what evidence
will be proffered by the plaintiff to prove this. Because she has no direct
evidence of copying, she must try to prove it inferentially by evidence of
access. In this scenario this will not be difficult because of the
widespread dissemination of the egyptologist's translation of the
play.1 Aside from this, she will also no doubt inform the trier-of-fact
that the American defendant is not an egyptologist and has no formal
training or experience in that area. Instead, the defendant is a clerk in
a used bookstore, whose formal education comprises an undergraduate
134. See, e.g., Cholvin v. B & F Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir. 1958) (repeated
radio broadcasts in the area where the defendant resides will suffice to prove access);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 982 (2d Cir. 1991) (proof that
the plaintiff's song was "#1" on the top hits chart was likewise sufficient to traverse the
access requirement). But see, e.g., Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(the fact that between two hundred and seven hundred copies of plaintiff's book were
available in bookstores was insufficient to permit an inference of access).
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and master's degree in the Chinese language. Additionally, the
egyptologist argues that she took five years to complete the translation;
the defendant completed his in three months.
. Consider how that information and the consequent determination of
whether the American prepared his work from the original public
domain text or whether he relied--even in part-upon the Chinese
translation, seem so crucial to the question whether the American's
activity is permissible, aside from any similarity between the two texts.
Obversely, consider how the issue of similarity between the two texts
seems inadequate to resolve the infringement question.
alone
. Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.' is an actual case very similar
to
the hypothetical just presented. In Toksvig plaintiff, Toksvig, published
a work entitled The Life ofHans ChristianAndersen, a biography of the
renown children's author. Years later, defendant, Hubbard, wrote a
novel entitled Flight of the Swan. Although Hubbard's work was a
novel, it was closely based on the life of Hans Christian Andersen."
Because Hubbard copied some passages verbatim from Toksvig's
biography, though limited to quotations contained in the latter's work
taken from letters and other sources clearly in the public domain, the
trial court found infringement; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 3" The
court did not bother to determine the scope of Toksvig's copyright; what
material was protectable and what was not. What the court did focus
on was that Toksvig had taken three years to complete her work, relying
solely on Danish sources including Andersen's original works and
letters."3' By contrast, the court found that defendant Hubbard
neither spoke nor read Danish and completed her novel in only eleven
months. 39
Next, consider Lipton v. Nature Co. " In Lipton plaintiff had
written a book comprised of "terms of venery," which are terms used to
describe a collection of entities, usually but not always, animals: "a
pride of lions," a "gaggle of geese," a "rafter of turkeys," a "parliament of
owls," and so forth."4 Apparently, collecting these terms is more
difficult than it appears because plaintiff claimed that he compiled the
terms "through research of various fifteenth-century texts and manuscripts ... [translating] the terms from Middle English to modem

135. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id at 666.
Id at 668.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 667.
71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 467 n.2.
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English and [arranging) them based on their 'lyrical and poetic
potential.' 142 In any event, the accused infringer did not dispute the
similarity between his work and plaintiff's; rather, he claimed that he
could not possibly have copied from plaintiff's book because he had never
seen it before." And apparently, the plaintiff was not able to prove
otherwise. Observe how this case, like so many other copyright disputes,
turns almost entirely on defendant's behavior-how he prepared his
work (from whom did he copy) rather than what he copied.'"
In conclusion, these cases suggest that the copyright owner's right to
exclude others from copying his work is highly conditional. More
particularly, a comparison of the two cases reveals the undeniable
dependence upon the method by which the accused infringer created the
text rather than upon the extent of similarity between the two texts.
How would INS v. AP have been decided if the defendant, instead of
publishing daily newspapers that competed directly with the plaintiff's
own daily newspapers, had used the purloined material for inclusion in
topical summaries published in a monthly news magazine? Far
differently, one might expect.
VI.

THE ULTIMATE QUESTION IN EVERY INFRINGEMENT DISPUTE

A.

The Ordinary Observer
In the previous section, I argued that the method by which the
accused infringer prepares his or her work is far more important than
the amount of protectable material common to both works in determining infringement. This section argues that the method is important as
a reliable filter, ultimately to determine whether the effect of the
unauthorized borrowing is market harm; without copying, no opportunity
exists for improper market harm. Thus, copying is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition to establish market harm.
Again, the quantitative similarity between the two works appears to
be virtually irrelevant compared with the method of the copying and
compared with the consequence to the second author's overall cost of

142.

Id. at 467.

143. Id.
144. Yet plaintiff was able to prove that the accused infringer had prepared his work
by copying from a third-party work. The way the court resolved this dilemma is
interesting. It compared the third-party work with the plaintiff's book and concluded that
the two were so similar that the third-party work had to have been copied from plaintiff's

book-which meant that defendant had actually had access to and copied from plaintiff's
copyright by virtue of copying from a third-party work that embodied protectable elements
of plaintiffs copyright claim. Id.
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expression. Of course, this effect translates 'into economic harm:
independent creation is not actionable because, without free-riding, both
parties bear about the same cost of creating their works. Hence, neither
can lower the price of copies down to marginal cost.
If free-riding, or the effect of the copying on the second author's cost
of expression, is the primary desideratum in copyright infringement,
then you need a way to predict it. That is what the copyright's copying
and access requirement does. If the defendant derived or is likely to
have derived his work from the plaintiff's work, then there is greater
probability that he reduced his cost of expression, a cost differential that
he can exploit in the form of lower price approaching marginal cost, to
the detriment of the original author who is unable to match that price
and still recoup his own cost of expression. Conversely, without copying,
then regardless of similarity, the defendant did not take a free ride on
the plaintiff's protectable expression. If the defendant did copy from the
plaintiff's text, a further assay is required to predict probable market
harm. The easiest way to do this is to ask the average consumer
whether he would confuse the two works--whether he would be led into
thinking that the latter is derived from the former. Hence, the ordinary
observer test applies: "[tihe lay listener's reaction is relevant because it
gauges the effect of the defendant's work on the plaintiff's market."145
Thus, the ordinary observer excused the movie based on the film, recast
in a different genre, though it retained the theme, plot, and essential
sequence of events.1" Yet the same ordinary observer condemned an
accused comic book though it only borrowed the characters (in name and
from a cartoon of a far different genre, theme, and storylikeness)
14 7
line.

So the ultimate infringement decision-provided the matter proceeds
this far-is left to the relentlessly maligned "ordinary observer." Like
tort law's "ordinary prudent person" and patent law's "person having
ordinary skill in the art," the "ordinary observer" is the fictional
character constructed to resolve one of our law's more unanswerable
questions."' We ask these hypothetical figures: What is "reasonable

145. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990).
146. Kretschmer, 1994 WL 259814, at *9.
147. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. Why is the ordinary observer the ultimate arbiter of copyright infringement? As
I mentioned earlier, in numerous instances, the common law determines liability based on
the reaction of on ordinary member of the relevant community (e.g., patent law's "person
having ordinary skill in the art," tort laws "ordinary prudent person," and so on). Aside
from subtle refinement-i.e., recognizing different communities or audiences from which
the ordinary person is selected (hence, the ordinary observer in a copyright infringement
dispute involving video games might be a twelve-year old child)-these legal rules appear
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care" under the circumstances? What constitutes an "obvious" technical
improvement over the state-of-the-art for which patent protection should
be denied? And, does one literary work borrow "unfairly" from
another-does it infringe?
If copyright law did confer a property right in the author's text, then
relying on the ordinary observer's deliberately uncritical opinion to
enforce intrusions upon that property right would be highly peculiar, to
say the least. In the case of fictional works, the infringement dispute is
turned over to the ordinary observer along with this data: (1) plaintiff
owns a copyright in the text at issue, which implies some minimal level
of originality, though precisely in what elements of that text the
originality resides is not determined or is essentially undeterminable;
and (2) the accused infringer created her work by copying from this text.
Given this information, the ordinary observer is instructed to render an
infringement verdict provided that the accused text strikes him as
having been derived from the plaintiff's text: "The test for substantial
similarity is whether an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work." 49 Notice that he is not asked to perform the far simpler task:
to identify discrete elements of the plaintiff's work in the accused work.
Notice also that if the factfinder determines beforehand that the plaintiff
does not own a valid copyright or, even if it does, that the accused
infringer independently created its work, then the court renders
summary judgment for the accused infringer, and the ordinary observer
is never invoked.
Professor Nimmer is perhaps the most persistent critic of the ordinary
observer standard (e.g., "It would seem preferable, in short, to discard
the audience test.")."W In his leading treatise, he asks: "Can there be
literary theft without an immediate and spontaneous detection by the
Nimmer quite correctly observes that "if this
ordinary observer?"'
question can be answered in the affirmative, then, obviously, the

to rarely change. One reason I suspect, and it is nothing more than a suspicion, is that
rules of this type represent stable equilibria along an evolutionary path. And as stable
equilibrium, they are robust--.e., they resist perturbation (legal challenge to the doctrine's
validity).
149. Kretschmer, 1994 WL 259814, at *8 (citing Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, 360 F.2d
1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966) and others). Notice that this is not unlike the "likelihood of
confusion" test in trademark law, which is unquestionably premised on confusion of the
ordinary consumer rather than a recognition of a property right in a particular trademark.
150. MELVILLE NIMMER & DAvuD NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[E][1][b], at

13-91 (1997).
151. I& at 13-94.
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audience test is inadequate."1 2 Professor Nimmer apparently believes
that the ordinary observer will excuse accused works though in fact they
actually embody protectable expression from the work-in-suit. We shall
put to one side the tautological nature of Nimmer's question because the
copyright community initiates know what he means. In any event, his
hypothesis is a testable one.
Suppose the novelist James Michener was interested in writing a
novel based on a short story by Dorothy Parker. Ms. Parker (one of the
knights of the celebrated "Algonquin Roundtable") wrote numerous short
stories, which, though quite entertaining, were also quite short-some
less than two thousand words. Yet except for his novels' titles (e.g.,
Texas, Hawaii),there is nothing short about Michener's novels. Most of
his novels average somewhere around three hundred thousand words.
Now suppose Michener creates a novel and in the process copies every
element from Ms. Parker's short story-the characters, theme, plot,
sequence of events, tone, style, and so on-except for her actual prose.
Suppose further that each of these elements is protectable (an almost
surely counterfactual assumption). By applying the contemporary
infringement standard, would the novel infringe the short story? Almost
certainly not.
To say that the two are "substantially similar" is perhaps to stretch
the meaning of the term too far even though it is a term of art. Consider
how the ordinary observer analysis would look. (Recall that in practice
the test is applied by separating the original and accused works into
discrete literary elements-theme, plot, and so forth-and asking for
each element whether it is substantially similar in the two works).
Again, Michener copied Ms. Parker's entire short story with the
exception of the exact prose she used. Notice that is not the same as
saying that the corresponding elements are the same in both works.
After all, Michener must have done something with his additional
298,000 words. Michener might have added additional (though minor)
characters, subplots, and so forth so that it really is a different work
than Ms. Parker's original short story. But that does not change the
fact, regardless of its legal significance, that he copied the entire short
story. Still, one would expect that Ms. Parker would lose this fight; the
novel would not infringe, for reasons I shall explain in a moment.
Miller v. CBS, Inc.,"' is a case very close to the Dorothy Parker
example. In Miller plaintiff, a former prisoner who studied law, received
his degree and passed the bar, all while in prison, and decided to write
a story about this unique experience. He wrote a three-page outline of
152. Id.
153. No. CV78-4291-RMT(Sx), 1980 WL 1179, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 1980).
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his story and mailed it to defendant, MCA Universal Television, who
incidently purchased a nine-month option but never exercised it.''
A few years later, CBS produced a TV series called KAZ about an excon who also became a lawyer while in prison. There were numerous
similarities between plaintiff's brief treatment and the accused TV show.
For instance, in both, the lead character (lawyer) filed suit on behalf of
incarcerated black muslims whose dietary requirements were frustrated
by the prison officials; in both, he was a "jailhouse lawyer" who filed
complaints on behalf of other inmates and acted as a judge to resolve
disputes among inmates; in both, the lawyer spent six years in a
maximum security prison in California, including stints in solitary
confinement; in both, the lawyer received sixteen employment rejections
while in prison; and in both, the lead character completed his entire law
degree by correspondence and passed the bar while in prison. The last
fact is significant because the plaintiff was, in real life, the only person
Still, the court granted defendant's
known to have ever done so."
motion for summary judgment.'" Like the Dorothy Parker example,
the court invoked the idea/expression dichotomy to deny protectability
to plaintiffs work despite the fact that the accused work contained
virtually plaintiffs entire work. 5 ' Plaintiff's work was a three-page
written outline. The accused work was a television show, a far more
detailed effort in a different medium.'
Finally, if copyright is viewed as a property right in a text, even a
qualified one, then the Dorothy Parker hypothetical and the Miller case
are difficult to reconcile under that regime: the accused infringer in
each instance borrowed the original author's entire text. Surely a
property right in the text or in whatever portion of it or however
qualified would proscribe an encroachment upon the property right. But
if a copyright is viewed as a limited property right of reasonable
commercial exploitation of the text, then the results do not seem so
outrageous.' 59 Indeed, this is further corroboration that copyright law
154. Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.

159. Miller is not an outlier-far from it. Similar (and consistent) results are reached
in film-adaptation disputes (plaintiff-novelist alleges copyright infringement by the
defendant filmmaker). According to my research, all contemporary film-adaptation cases
appear to have the following attributes in common: in each case, the defendant
(screenwriter or filmmaker) admitted that he had read plaintiffs novel and copied from it;
the plaintiffs and defendant's work share the same basic concept or premise; the defendant
copied discrete events, characters, or entire scenes from plaintiffs novel; the defendant took
what I believe to be the essence of the work (its message, its thematic intention, and its
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does not appear to permit the copyright owner to capture the full value
that consumers attach to his or her work but rather delimits protection
at or near the minimum threshold needed to support his or her
investment.
I predicted that the accused infringer in the Dorothy Parker hypothetical, though he had borrowed the entire text, would not be liable for
copyright infringement just as the similarly situated defendant in Miller
was not. The reason is that the ordinary observer/substantial similarity
test looks at the two works as a whole; it does not isolate and then
compare only the protectable elements as patent law does. Instead, it
judges two texts in their commercial form and not in the form of their
legal claim (considering only their protectable elements). Judged that
way, they are nothing alike.'
More than anything else though, the conclusion that Michener is not
liable to Dorothy Parker for copyright infringement is a deliberate error
of parallax by the ordinary observer. Just as an ordinary viewer may
believe the same object to be two distinct objects when viewed from two
different perspectives (lighting, angle, distance), the perception of the
ordinary observer asked to compare two works of drastically different
size, style, and medium is too strained in instances like these to be
reliable. Perhaps this is an inherent flaw in the legal standard, and
perhaps the test had actually evolved to achieve that result. Indeed,
perhaps it is time that we recognize the ordinary observer test for what
it really is: a true market-based filter, necessary because the precise
boundaries of protectable portions of the text are not determinable. So
the ordinary observer tries instead to predict probable harm to the
market for the first author's work from among only those cases in which
the accused infringer actually copies protectable expression from the
plaintiff.
To return to Nimmer's polemic toward the ordinary observer test, I do
not disagree with his empirical claim that the literary theft can occur
without the ordinary observer detecting it. Indeed, I have just tried to
prove it. Rather, I argue that cases of that sort do not prove the

unique impression upon the reader); and each case was decided on summary judgment for
the defendant.
160. By the way, the ideatexpression dichotomy is the legal rubric upon which a court
would likely ground that conclusion. The court would likely fixate on the fact that where
Ms. Parker's lead character was described in two thousand words, he or she is described
using twenty times that many words in the accused novel. This disparity in the level of
generality at which the same character is depicted in the two different works would tempt
the court to say that Ms. Parker's lead character is simply too general and too abstract to
qualify as protectable expression, particularly in light of Michener's far more detailed
treatment of the same material.
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irrationality of the ordinary observer standard but suggest that the
ordinary observer is designed to detect something, other than the
presence of isolated snippets of purloined material in the accused text.
That something else is probable market harm, an endpoint for which the
ordinary observer is ideally suited.
B. The Equitable Defense of Fair Use
The ordinary observer test is relied upon to determine infringement
in fiction works; it is not generally used to judge infringement in works
of nonfiction. In this section the standard used in nonfiction works shall
be discussed, and this Article shall argue that, though it appears very
different from the ordinary observer standard, it too is premised on the
likelihood of market harm rather than on an isolated comparison of the
two texts. In other words, both the fiction works and nonfiction works
infringement standards, though superficially distinct tests, are actually
directed to the identical endpoint.
Refer back to Kregos v. Associated Press,16' a case discussed earlier
as an "exemplar" of a copyright dispute in which the precise boundaries
of the protectable portion of the text were actually determined. In
Kregos the original/protectable portions of the text were readily
determinable. This is often the case in nonfiction works. As we shall
see, the infringement analysis in these instances moves quickly away
from a precise definition of the protectable portion of the text and
quickly towards liability based purely on market harm; however, a brief
digression is needed before we go further.
Copyright law is deeply fissured into two domains-two distinct bodies
of law that are drastically different though, quite astonishingly, rarely
discussed that way. In other words, two different legal standards exist
to judge infringement of fiction works versus works of nonfiction. The
typical infringement dispute over a nonfiction work involves literal
(verbatim) copying by the accused infringer. The copyright plaintiff
begins by identifying the discrete element or elements copied from his
work. So long as what was taken is eligible for copyright protection, the
infringement analysis per se is straightforward and proceeds quickly to
the real infringement analysis under the guise of the "fair use" defense,
which is nothing more than a set of disparate exceptions to excuse
otherwise infringing activity. 2 Under fair use, the qualitative (not
quantitative) importance of the portion taken is emphasized. Moreover,
the similarity of the two works as a whole is almost never considered
important to the infringement analysis but only later in the fair use
161. 795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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analysis, particularly the last prong of the analysis, which scrutinizes
the effect of the accused work on the market for the original. By
contrast, fiction works are judged as a whole without any particular
regard to discrete elements. 1"
For instance, consider Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,"' which illustrates the nonfiction standard. In 1977
Charlie Chaplin died. Though an immensely popular figure much
earlier, Chaplin was virtually unknown to younger film audiences. This
was because he had spent the last twenty years of his life outside the
United States (having been forced out of the country on account of
political pressure stemming from Senator McCarthy's anticommunism
hysteria) and because (perhaps in response to this) he deliberately
withheld his later films from distribution within the United States.
Upon Chaplin's death, CBS network decided to prepare a major
television biography. Given the subject, the biography would naturally
have to include some sort of retrospective of Chaplin's films but would
also discuss his personal and political life as well. This documentary
was scheduled to air on television during prime time. However, CBS
had a slight problem. While some of Chaplin's films were in the public
domain, others were not. In fact, the owner of the copyright in some of
the films had repeatedly refused to grant a license to CBS so that it
could prepare its documentary. But CBS went ahead anyway. To
prepare its approximately ninety-minute documentary, CBS used
excerpts from five of Chaplin's films whose copyrights were owned by a
third party. Together, these excerpts comprised about nine minutes of
a total of almost eight hours of film from which the excerpts were
taken." Despite the fact that CBS's use of the copyrighted works was
minimal, indeed no more than necessary, and despite the fact that the
film excerpts were used creatively rather than imitatively to produce an
entirely new work drastically different from the plaintiff's (i.e., it was a
transformative use) and despite the fact that the CBS documentary did
not appropriate the economic value of the Chaplin films, the court found
the use to be an infringement.66 Yet the ordinary observer would
have pardoned this use because the two works (the Chaplin films) when
compared with the TV biography are aesthetically different (though some

163. Compare Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984)
(nonfiction) with Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Hand, J.).
164. 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982).
165. Id. at 1097.
166. Id. at 1104. CBS's fair use defense was rejected as well.
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variants of the test focus upon whether the ordinary observer would
recognize one as having been derived from the other).167
In the vast majority of infringement disputes over nonfiction works,
the infringement analysis is straightforward; typically, the accused
infringer has borrowed verbatim a discrete element from the plaintiff's
text, which is readily identifiable in the accused work (e.g., a quote or a
photograph). Hence, the infringement analysis proceeds fairly quickly
toward the "real" infringement analysis: fair use. In essence, the fair
use "defense" is a second infringement test.s' Indeed, fair use is
In
litigated far more often than the prima facie infringement case.'
fact, rather than being an affirmative defense to a charge of infringement, fair use historically was procedurally and substantively intertwined with the infringement analysis; only recently have the two
inquires diverged. So it appears that the fair use doctrine (nonfiction
works) and the ordinary observer standard (fiction works) generate
parallel results by entirely different means.

167. Perhaps the ordinary observer would condemn the TV biography for the reason
that I suggested in the parenthetical-that he would recognize that the TV biography was
derived from the Chaplin films. Still, the most common formulation of the ordinary
observer test is not the "derived from" variant but the "would regard their aesthetic appeal
the same" one. But this brings up an interesting point. Even though the TV biography is
comprised of about ninety percent original material with only ten percent coming from the
plaintiffs works, that ten percent is still readily recognizable within the accused work even
when viewed as a whole. This is a typical aspect of many copyright disputes over
nonfiction works: the purloined material is incorporated into the accused work in a way
that it is readily recognizable within the accused work (like mixing gin and lime juice).
Generally, though not always, fiction cases look differently. The incorporation of
borrowed material (e.g., a basic sequence of events) into the accused work is more like a
chemical reaction between the borrowed material and the new stuff-the borrowed material
is no longer separately recognizable once subsumed within the accused work but becomes
an organic part of the whole (like combining carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen to get sucrose).
Hence the ordinary observer would overlook the borrowed material and excuse the copying.
One exception among cases involving fiction works includes "character" cases in which
the accused infringer creates an entirely new work around a character (Sam Spade, Mighty
Mouse) borrowed from the original. In these instances, the borrowed element is actually
recognizable within the accused work. This might explain why these cases stand out
among fiction work cases, which generally tolerate substantial copying without
infringement, though not in the character cases. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (and cases cited therein).
168. That the fair use inquiry is the "real" infringement analysis is no secret. See, e.g.,
Laura G. Lappe, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to
Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 188 (1994). "[C]ourts frequently either omit or give cursory
treatment to the issue of infringement when the fair use defense is raised." Id. at 185. On
this, I believe Professor Lappe is quite correct; indeed, in nineteenth-century infringement
cases, fair use was blended with the infringement analysis.
169. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 1372.

COPYRIGHT LAW

1998]

695

Fair use is an enormous and often disparate c6llection of exceptions to
liability, judicially codified since 1976 into copyright law. 70 By far the
most important of these exceptions is 17 U.S.C. § 107(4): "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
Therefore, fair use explicitly redirects liability toward economic harm,
or at least putative economic harm, and away from an isolated determination of the scope of protectable expression of the plaintiff's text. As
evidence of this, the doctrine of fair use has been invoked in numerous
instances to excuse even verbatim borrowing from the copyright owner's
work. For instance, in Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, 7' the
Supreme Court relied on fair use to immunize copying an entire
television show by home video-cassette recorder (VCR) owners.'7 2 This
copying was excused on the ground that the copying did not curtail
Similarly, the Copyright
viewer demand for the television shows.7
Act of 1976 contains an explicit provision to permit whole-text copying
for books and periodicals for educational purposes.'74 This activity is
immunized by similar reasoning. Consider also Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.'75 In Consumers Union
defendant incorporated a verbatim excerpt from plaintiff's magazine,
176
which recommended defendant's product, into its advertisement.
The court found this use to be fair on the ground that the demand for
plaintiff's work (that particular magazine issue) was not
77 likely to be
suppressed by defendant's use of the borrowed material.
VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A TEXT'S COPYRIGHTABLE
ELEMENTS AND ITS AESTHETIC APPEAL IS PROBLEMATIC

A.

Introduction
Copyright would function most efficiently to encourage the protection
of original works of authorship if a perfect correlation existed between
copyrightability-protectability and economic value-if those elements of
a text responsible for its aesthetic appeal (hence, economic value)
corresponded to the protectable elements. Aesthetic appeal matters

170. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
171.

172.
173.
174.
(1974).
175.

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

Id. at 447.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976); see also S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 64-65
724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).

176. Id. at 1050.
177. Id. at 1051.
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because that is ostensibly the thing to which the ordinary observer
responds. Also, economic value matters because the infringement
standard should ideally be calibrated upon the authors' incentives to
create, which for present purposes are best approximated as purely
economic. Indeed, the most easily identified endpoint for infringement
is economic harm to the copyright owner's market position relating to
the copyrighted text. In any event, whatever elements of a literary text
copyright law protects, one would at least expect that it would protect
its "essence" or that combination of elements primarily responsible for
its aesthetic appeal, hence its economic value. By "economic value" I
mean the commercial value of the text plus the commercial value of all
reasonably foreseeable derivative embodiments comprised of the
protectable elements of the original copyright claim (as embodied in text
deposited with the registration certificate).
Again, my question is this: does contemporary copyright law protect
the "essence" of an author's work? This is actually two questions. First,
the threshold question: for any given literary work, do those elements
that contribute to the work's aesthetic appeal (hence, economic value)
tend to qualify for protection by copyright-are they original, sufficiently
concrete? The second question is this: even if those elements that
comprise a work's essence are copyrightable, is. this copyright enforceable-can the first author protect them from copying by others? These
two questions may appear to be the same at first, but heuristically they
are best separated.
B. The Relationship Between a Work's Aesthetic Essence and
Copyrightability
Obviously I do not expect to find some unifying principle nor even
robust empirical correlation-just tendencies. Consider Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., one of Judge Learned Hand's
last copyright opinions. This case involved possible infringement of
plaintiff's ornamental design imprinted upon cloth used to make
women's dresses. Defendant's cloth was similar but not identical to
plaintiff's. 7 9 The essential question for Hand was: would the ordinary
observer regard their aesthetic appeal as the same notwithstanding the

178. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). It occurs to me that one cannot write an article on
copyright without citing at least one Judge Learned Hand opinion. I believe Judge Hand
wrote many outstanding copyright opinions although some he botched, like Peter Pan
Fabrics. I intend, at the risk of heresy, to discuss Judge Hand's copyright opinions with
the same objective perspective with which I examine all others, which is to say not
absolutely paralyzed by reverence.
179. Id. at 489.
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differences? Hand said yes, and that was the end of the matter;
defendant was an infringer.' But it is actually much more complicated that.
What Hand did was proceed immediately to infringement without first
dealing with the originality problem.' 8' In other words, Hand's
analysis was correct if plaintiff's entire cloth design was original, which
is highly unlikely. This complicates everything; for one thing, you have
to establish the protectable elements of plaintiffs design and then ask
what features of the design are responsible for its aesthetic appeal.
Then you must compare those two sets of features. Is it the fabric color,
its texture, the overall pattern, the arrangement of the symbols and
figures within that pattern, or the symbols and figures themselves?
What if the ordinary observer responded only to the color and the overall
pattern, neglecting everything else (which is certainly plausible)?
Suppose, however, that those features are not original and thus not
protectable (also a reasonable assumption). If that is true, then Hand's
analysis was improper because the aesthetic appeal was due to public
d6main elements. Hence, if the accused infringer's cloth consisted of
only those elements that comprised the aesthetic appeal of plaintiff's
cloth (features in the public domain), then it would not infringe even
though the ordinary observer would regard the two as similar because
their aesthetic appeal was essentially the same. I offer this example
only to show that those elements in which the work's aesthetic appeal
resides are quite likely to be unprotectable.
So what are the protectable elements of a literary work? Remember
that copyright law makes no aesthetic judgments: if the work is original
and complies with the other statutory requirements, then it is protected
by copyright. Copyright protects the circus poster as well as the
architectural drawing, the stuffed animal as well as the marble
sculpture, the nursery rhyme as well as the lyric poem, the advertising
jingle as well as the symphonic score, and the telephone book as well as
8 2 In other words, a greater aesthetic contributhe literary biography."
tion does not necessarily mean greater copyright protection.

180, Id.
181. Id. at 488. Really, that is a pleading problem. The defendant's lawyer should
have defined, and hence narrowed, plaintiff's original contribution at the injunction
hearing.
182. See, for example, Justice Holmes' opinion (from which I borrowed the reference
to the circus poster) in Bleistein v. DonaldsonLithograph Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903) ("It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations. .. ."). See also, e.g., Rushton
v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
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First, the protectable elements are, of course, a subset of the original
elements. A particular "element" in a copyrighted work may be
unprotectable for only two reasons: either it is not original or the
particular element is not per se protectable, which means it is an idea
or concept somehow too abstract to protect. So we begin with the
original elements and pare them down using idea/expression, scenes-afaire, and the merger doctrine. That copyright protection does not
extend to ideas, plots, dramatic situations, and events is bedrock
copyright law." Rare exceptions exist if these elements are original
and sufficiently detailed."' Yet copyright protection extends beyond
the precise words the author uses--e.g., a play's dialogue."
Somewhere between these two constraints, the boundary separating protectable from unprotectable expression exists. One often-cited aphorism is:
"[Tihe essence of infringement lies in taking not a general theme but its
particular expression through similarities
II of treatment, details, scenes,
events and characterization.""
The overwhelming majority (judged either quantitatively or qualitatively) of the literary elements that comprise any work-theme, plot,
characters, setting, and so forth-is not protectable. This is true
generally for the same reasons that any particular thing is not copyrightable: it is not original (there is a similar enough antecedent out
there somewhere), or it is too vague to be protectable expression (e.g., a
story's theme or premise is almost never protectable).
Even when the elements are sufficiently specific to qualify as
"expression," they very often are caught in the filter known as "scenes-afaire," meaning that the particular thing is inevitable given the broader
literary element under which it is subsumed. For instance, if the
premise is life in a South Bronx police precinct and the protagonist is a
hard-drinking, cynical yet professionally dedicated Irish cop, courts
almost always say that this character (even if he is substantially more
well-developed than that) is predictable or inevitable in any story that
has the same premise (e.g., a comic movie about American tourists in
France will likely include a scene, or several, where the locals are
unusually rude toward the visitors). Scenes-a-faire is the most common

183. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986); Warner Bros. v.
ABC, 654 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981); ONeill v. Dell Publ'g Co., 630 F.2d 685, 686 (1st

Cir. 1980); Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1977); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967).

184. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d. Cir. 1930) ("[W]e do not
doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement.").
185. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,55 (2d Cir. 1936) (and cases
cited therein).
186. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976).
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legal device used in contemporary film-adaptation cases to separate
protectable from unprotectable subject matter and works to the benefit
8 7
of the accused infringer."
Additionally, the sine qua non of copyright is originality, which means
that the author must contribute something new, however trivial.se
But how well-stocked is the ordinary observer's mental library so that
he can scan for literary antecedents to the work whose originality he is
charged with judging? Perhaps he might be able to identify certain

archetypal characters upon which more mundane characters of modern
fiction are based, such as Oedipus, Hamlet, Faust, Quixote, Clarissa
Harlowe, or Tristan; however, I doubt it. Or if the ordinary observer did
not know that the novelist borrowed his sequence of events from a local
newspaper account of a small town murder, he would believe that to be
an original, hence protectable, element of the novel. Yet we expect this

187. All of the modem film adaptation cases, for instance, grossly over-rely on the
scenes-a-faire doctrine, which goes a long way toward explaining why what I certainly
believed were some very close cases were decided on summary judgment. It seems to me
that this is a by-product of defining a work's theme too broadly. Scenes-a-faire is generally
defined as stock. scenes that inevitably flow from a particular concept, genre, theme, or
other. For instance, a story about life in a South Bronx police station is likely to feature
a hard-drinking and cynical but dedicated Irish cop, and that particular character at that
level of abstraction is deemed unprotectable by scenes-a-faire. The reader can see that the
more broadly one defines a work's theme, the more expression is subsumed under it. The
following are examples from the case law. Defending Your Life case: "The use of
courtrooms, judges, jurors, and attorneys is inevitable in any treatment ofjudgment in the
afterlife, and as such, constitutes scenes-a-faire, and are thus unprotectable." Kretschmer,
1994 WL 259814, at *8 (citing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92
(2d Cir. 1976)). GroundhogDay case: "Any similarities in structure stem directly from the
idea of a repeating day and, hence, are unprotectable." Arden v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
908 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In both of these cases, the courts defined the
work's theme too broadly. In the former case, the court thinks it is "judgment in the
afterlife" and in the latter, "a repeating day." I am certainly no literary critic. Yet that
is not a prerequisite to see that the courts have completely mischaracterized these works.
In both instances, what the court thinks is the theme is really a means of expressing the
theme. If this is correct, is it sensible to invoke the scenes-a-faire doctrine? In other
words, can expression that supports (at a lower level of abstraction) other (protectable)
expression somehow be unprotectable?
What is more, I think judges are relying on more than a little hindsight when invoking
this doctrine. Sure, the particular element seems to the reader to be an inevitable aspect
to the story. Indeed, the writer went to great lengths to make it seem that way. Also,
even if particular elements, taken one-at-a-time (say, a character or an event) are actually
scenes-a-faire, the entire set of elements should often be protectable as a whole-indeed,
protection for a particular selection and arrangements of elements is bedrock copyright law.
The formal rubric is known as a "compilation." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
188. See, eg., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes,

700

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

of him. Otherwise, he credits the copyright plaintiff with more
originality and hence a greater scope of protection than he deserves.
Finally, though an educated yet hurried ordinary observer, such as a
federal trial judge, might be specifically unaware of or at least unable to
recall the contents of particular texts that may bear on the originality
of the work-in-suit, she is no doubt aware of the enormous stock of
literary precedent. She is also no doubt aware that the more abstractly
defined a particular literary element (character, plot, etc.) is the more
likely it is that there exists a literary antecedent for it. Perhaps it is
this awareness that is responsible, more than anything else, for the very
narrow level of protection given to literary works. Along with the
obverse impression that a new work of fiction that does not embody
elements copied verbatim from the original does not therefore involve
enough free-riding on the original author's efforts tojustify infringement,
this awareness is largely responsible for the extraordinarily strict
infringement standard already applied to judge infringement of literary
works.
With respect to fiction works, as we have seen, separating protectable
from unprotectable expression (or determining the scope of a copyright)
is far too difficult, which is why, for instance, courts seldom bother.
Second, as we have also seen from the DrivingMiss Daisy example, very
little of any literary work is original and therefore protectable.
There is a virtually inexhaustible supply of other examples to show
that even great works of fiction comprise a thin veneer applied over a
solid layer of literary precedent. One leading copyright scholar
commented that the contemporary play, West Side Story, would infringe
9 Yet Romeo and Juliet would more
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet.""
than likely have infringed Ovid's story of Pyramus and Thisbe, which in
fact inspired Shakespeare's play.
Hence, the majority of any work of fiction is comprised largely of
unprotectable material."9 Therefore, one might suspect from this fact
alone an ambiguous relationship between the protectable elements of a
text and those elements responsible for its aesthetic appeal.

189. MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIM[ER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03A], at 13-33
(1997).
190. Also, the protectable elements are undoubtedly defined by the medium in which

they appear. For instance, in copyright infringement cases involving photographs, the
dispute is never focused upon the subject but rather upon things like the "photographer's
selection of background, lights, shading, positioning and timing." Gentieu v. John Muller
& Co., 712 F. Supp. 740, 742 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.

Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)). See also, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp.
130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Next, what is aesthetic appeal? I was unable to find a suitable
definition, just a lot of synonyms: its essence, its spirit, the author's
thematic intention. For present purposes, I am content to say that
clearly there is such a thing as "aesthetic appeal"-though not defined-because writers, filmmakers, critics, and quite obviously judges,
refer to it all the time. Again, I shall refer to it, tautologically I suppose,
as the corpus of the work's elements to which the ordinary observer
responds.
But is it protectable by copyright? Sometimes, clearly yes. For
instance., Edgar Rice Burroughs' noble savage character, Tarzan, is
protectable191 as is Dashiell Hammett's Sam Spade,' Faulkner's
mythical' world and setting for several of his novels, and A.S. Byatt's
complex plot structures found in her novels, such as Possession and
Tower of Babel. Even narrative style may be protectable as in the
spectacular and hauntingly evocative The Alchymist's Journalby Evan
Connel in which the story is told by extracts from the fictional journals
of seven sixteenth-century alchemists. Similarly, the literary style of the
renown children's author, Dr. Seuss---comprised of whimsical, jittery,
staccato rhyme--is protectable. 1" Indeed, even theme, if original and
sufficiently developed, may be protectable, such as that expressed in Ayn
Rand's The Fountainheadand Atlas Shrugged.
Despite these examples, I am tempted to say that more often than not,
those elements that comprise a work's essence are not protected by
copyright. I will resist that urge, however, and instead just say this:
based on my own research, far beyond the examples I just recited, there
appears to be no correlation between a work's essence and protectability.
Put another way, the features of a work that comprise its aesthetic
appeal appear poorly correlated with its protectable elements. Toward
the "essence" of a work of fiction, copyright law is apparently quite
indifferent.
An empirical corroboration of this claim is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, I shall provide anecdotal evidence sufficient in scope to
hopefully persuade the reader. An example: audiences are attracted to
some movies due solely to the sheer scale of the special effects: Jurassic
191. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd
mem., 636 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1980); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 519 F. Supp. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
192. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
193. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (S.D.
Cal. 1996). In my opinion, this case establishes the frontier for protection of abstract
literary elements. I am unable to identify another case like it: "[D]r. Seuss's choice as to
stanza type (tercet), rhyme (masculine perfect), assonance, and accent are all protectable
and all appropriated." Id.
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Park, for instance. How many saw it for the ethical dilemma posed?
How many would have seen it if it were animated? I concede, however,
that not all special effect masterpieces derived their appeal from that
source alone; Gone with the Wind, Jaws, and E.T all had more going for
them than flammable cities, mechanical fish, and cuddly extraterrestrials.
Other films rely largely on their "concept," or basic premise to create
appeal. Movies of this type are known in Hollywood as "high concept"
pictures. Examples: Waterworld (life after the polar ice caps melt
caused by global warming), Big (a child's soul in a grownup's body), and
Back to the Future (traveling back in time to redo things to turn out the
way you wish they had happened in the first place). Naturally, none of
these concepts is protectable or even close. Yet they are the undeniable
source of the films' appeal and their economic value.
In other films the essential appeal may reside in the basic premise or
the original idea (which are almost always too abstract to qualify as
protectable expression even if they were original). For instance, consider
these cases, all involving critically acclaimed and financially successful
Defending Your Life (redemption through
feature-length films:
overcoming fear demonstrated through one ordinary person's "sham"
trial and judgment in the afterlife); GroundhogDay (a man is forced to
repeat the same day, though the others around him are oblivious to the
repetition. He first seeks to take advantage of this otherwise unfortunate situation through repeated attempts at seducing his neighbor, then
becomes frustrated and suicidal); Driving Miss Daisy (an AfricanAmerican servant is employed by a Jewish master, and the formal
relationship dissolves, along with long-held racial beliefs as the two
become devoted friends), and so on. Incidently, each of these movies was
the focus of separate lawsuits brought by a novelist who claimed the
movie infringed his novel. In each of these instances, I recited what I
believed to be the source of the novel's aesthetic appeal. And in each
instance, the filmmaker copied exactly what I recited but did not
infringe the novelist's work.'
Sometimes the elements that comprise a work's aesthetic appeal may
simply be unidentifiable. That is, the work is not so easily dissected,

which means that the work's essence may arise from a delicate fusion of
a plurality of elements, some protectable, some not. What then?
Consider this musing by one noted literary critic who was struggling to
identify what features of a Chekhov short story gave it its appeal or
essence:

194. In fact, each of these cases was decided on summary judgment for the defendant.
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[B]ut there is also something else-every sensitive reader feels
this-there is the writer's spirit ....
And it is Chekhov's spirit ...

that makes this story so lovely. We can point to it, but hardly do more
.... Is the "spirit" of a work of art no more than the sum of its
technical elements?'"

Upon reflection, the incongruence between aesthetic appeal and
copyright protection should not seem counter-intuitive. First, protectability is a function of originality. How is originality related to aesthetic
appeal? (I am using the term "originality" in the everyday sense, not the
formal copyright law sense, though the two meanings are essentially
interchangeable for present purposes). Again, one could, I am sure,
empirically demonstrate that the vast bulk of most fiction works is
comprised of expression in the public domain, which is another way of
saying that most works are comprised of very little protectable expression. As I have said, this alone suggests a tenuous relationship between
originality and a work's aesthetic appeal. Paradoxically though, perhaps
an inverse relationship exists between the two.
For instance, few movies intended for mass audiences contain any
original expression beyond their literal components, and yet many think
they are quite entertaining-the sources of the audience satisfaction are
shamelessly and perpetually reworked personae, themes, and plot
structures. The same can be said for contemporary novels of the legalthriller genre. Indeed, the appeal quite often lies in the familiar, which
suggests that if aesthetic appeal does not inversely correlate with
originality, then at least "commercial appeal" certainly might. In fact,
I do not see anything unusual about the notion that an audience's (or an
ordinary observer's) perception might be drawn to the familiar. What
a person likes, he wants to see again, as evidenced by the fact that some
of the best-selling books are sequels in which each subsequent novel
presents the same lead character transposed in a new setting. Many
novels of the "detective genre" fit this description. What follows from
this? The aspect of the work that the ordinary observer may fixate upon
is quite likely to be unprotectable. And of course, that result does not
translate into an infringement verdict because the ordinary observer test
is supposed to account for it by filtering out unprotectable expression.

195. IRvING HowE, A Carrc's NOTEBOOK 135-36 (1995).
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C. Can Those Elements That Comprise a Work's Essence Be Protected
Against Copying?
Even in those rare instances in which a work's essence does qualify for
copyright protection, can the copyright oiner protect that essence
against borrowing by others? The answer is obviously yes if we assume
that copying protectable expression always leads to an infringement
verdict. Yet, as we shall see, rather than being a premise, this must be
the conclusion that we test.
In the previous section I argued that the elements of a fiction work
that comprise its aesthetic appeal are very often unprotectable. Thus,
even a work with the same aesthetic appeal as a prior work may not
infringe; the ordinary observer does not base its conclusion of substantial
similarity upon unprotectable elements (or at least it is not supposed to
anyway). What I discuss in this section is that the opposite scenario is
likely to occur as well: the subsequent work borrows the elements
responsible for the aesthetic appeal from the prior work, but the
ordinary observer fails to recognize them once transplanted in the second
work.
In some instances (like the ones that I recited earlier, such as The
Tower of Babel and The Maltese Falcon),if the essence of another's work
is extracted and incorporated into a subsequent work recast in another
form, such as a novel set in modern times or a feature-length film
intended for mass-appeal, that essence would surely survive those
distortions, and no court would hesitate to call the new work-whether
itself highly original or not-an infringement.
Indeed, courts from time to time try to identify a work's essence as the
thing that copyright law should protect. This is not the majority view
but a pervasive one nonetheless. Consider the case involving the
copyrightability of Dashiell Hammett's famous detective character, "Sam
Spade." The Ninth Circuit in dictum commented upon whether a
literary character, apart from all other literary elements comprising the
work, is protectable alone: "[11f the character is only the chessman in
the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection
afforded by the copyright [unless the character really constitutes the
story being told]."' It is inconceivable that the court, by acknowledging this, would be willing to sanction the theft of one of the fundamental
components of an artist's intellectual property. The court, it seems, has
conditioned copyright protection on how important a particular literary
element is to the work as a whole or whether it is a "fundamental

196. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 950.
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component" of the author's work. Similarly, Justice Traynor made these
remarks about protectability: "[I]n those matters as to which copyright
protects-that is, the spirit or soul infusing the creatures of the author's
imagination ... ."'7 And in cases involving a technical document:

"Whatever similarities or differences there are in the report generally,
the critical parts of the reports-the antenna design-are identical.
Taking what is in essence the heart of the work is considered a taking
of a substantial nature, even if what is actually taken is less than
extensive."'
Because originality is the sine qua non of copyright protection, the
view expressed above has some rational force: what the author himself
created is the essence of the work. Hammett's Sam Spade is by
consensus the heart of The Maltese Falcon-itsessence, the source of its
aesthetic appeal; Dashiell Hammett -created an original persona
embodied in Sam Spade. In that case a near perfect correlation exists
between commercial value, protectability, and the essence of the work.
Hence, the court had no trouble recognizing it.
Other times, an infringer may borrow the copyrightable essence of
another's work, or at least a substantial part of it anyway, with
impunity. For instance, a subsequent work that retains the essential
aspect of the original but that differs from it at a lower level of
abstraction (such as the prose), may often have a different aesthetic
appeal than the original. Consider this example: the overwhelming
majority of any novel is unprotectable because it consists of ideas,
scenes-a-faire, merged expression, historical fact, and other material in
the public domain and not least of all because the infringement standard
used to judge whether a movie infringes a novel is, for one reason or
another, unusually favorable to the accused filmmaker. Bedrock
copyright law principles unambiguously support the conclusion that
copyright protection stops well short of protecting a "story line" or basic
plot structure, which again, appears to be the transplantable element of
a novel. 199

197. Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
198. WPOW, Inc. v. MRIJ, 584 F. Supp 132, 136 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing Elsmere Music,
Inc. v. NBC' 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980)).
199. See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87,91 (2d Cir. 1976)
("ITihe essence of infringement lies in taking not a general theme but its particular
expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization.")
See also, e.g., Denker, 820 F. Supp. at 732.
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D. Conclusion
Tb conclude this section, the relationship between aesthetic appeal and
copyrightability is approximately random-the two are uncorrelated.
Also, even when the essence of a work is copyrightable (original,
sufficiently concrete) a subsequent author may still copy that essence, or
those elements that create the work's aesthetic appeal, provided it is no
longer recognizable by the ordinary observer in the subsequent work
judged as a whole-a scenario that recurs frequently, particularly in the
case of derivative works prepared in media different than the original
work.
VIII.

COPYRIGHT IS TAXONOMICALLY SIMILAR TO MISAPPROPRIATION

One primary conclusion derived from the thesis advanced in this
Article is that copyright law is much more closely related to the common
law tort of misappropriation than it is to a pure property regime like
patent law. The four primary indicia of misappropriation are: (1) the
plaintiff has created a thing having substantial commercial value; (2) it
fixates on the method of copying rather than on the thing being copied;
(3) the defendant acquired or created the thing at a substantially lower
cost than that incurred by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff must have
suffered some harm caused by the defendant's conduct. 2' Conspicuously absent, of course, is a step requiring definition of the property
right upon which the misappropriation plaintiff alleges the defendant
intruded.
Misappropriation, therefore, provides a remedy for more than just
direct competitive injury though less than any unauthorized intrusion
against the thing created by the plaintiff. Instead, it protects an actual
and putative market position that plaintiff has acquired by virtue of
considerable expense, which plaintiff alone has borne, against "unfair"
0 1
and "harmful" commercial activity."
Precisely what right is the misappropriation plaintiff claiming? How
is it related to the thing created (the text)? Consider the plaintiff in INS
v. AP. Would AP have objected if INS had independently prepared its
own news stories (without copying from AP's) even though the two are,
in the end, highly similar? Or would AP have objected if INS had copied
the news stories from AP but instead of selling a competing newspaper

200. J. THOMAS MCCARTRY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 10:51, at 10-95 (1996). See also INS v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
201. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Supp. Ct. 1950), affd, 279 App. Div. 632 (N.Y.A.D. 1951).
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had used them to prepare a bi-monthly news magazine? I suspect that
the answer to both questions is no and that even if AP had objected, the
court may not have condemned the misappropriation. Similarly, an
independently created work does not infringe a copyright; nor does an
appropriation of a copyrighted work-no matter how much protectable
expression it borrows from the first work-if it does not appear to the
casual observer that it was derived from the former work.
Next, how closely related, if at all, are copyright and misappropriation? Imagine a spectrum of enforceable rights in intangible property;
at one end is unfair competition, of which "palming off" is a suitable
exemplar, and at the other a "pure" property right scheme, such as
patent law. Somewhere in between these two is INS v. AP-type
misappropriation; near this are trade-secret law and trademark law.
The question is where copyright law is located along this continuum.
Patent law represents a property right enforceable against the entire
public; it is a set of absolute prohibitions against exercising any of the
exclusive rights granted to the patent owner. The specifics of the
defendant's conduct (other than that he made/used/sold/offered for
sale/imported the accused device) is irrelevant; whether he is a free-rider
is also irrelevant. The nature of the accused method or device, beyond
the fact that it infringes, is likewise irrelevant to liability. In other
words, the focus is not on the method of creating the thing but upon the
thing itself.
More similar to the tort of misappropriation and less similar to patent
law, copyright infringement proceeds without a definition of the
protectable portion of the text, a determination that, as was shown
earlier, is quite often intractable. So too, copyrights are not readily
asserted against third parties without regard to the nature of the latter's
use of the material. By "use" I mean how the material is incorporated
into the defendant's new work, what is the nature of the defendant's
final product, and how it impairs the market for the plaintiff's creation.
In that sense a copyright is at best a highly conditional property right
in the thing copied; Miller and Toksvig prove that much. But more
probably, Miller strongly suggests that whatever legal entitlement
copyright confers, it cannot possibly confer a property right in a "text."
And as argued in previous sections, the legal right conferred by
copyright looks far more like a property right in a narrowly defined
market position.
Second, the only possible justification for immunizing an accused
infringer who did not copy from the plaintiff's work but independently
created his own is that the absence of copying is a reliable proxy (along
with evidence of consumer confusion supplied by the ordinary observer)
for the lack of any real economic harm. Indeed, the harm is caused by
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(1) pricing below the first author's marginal cost (made possible by the
accused infringer's lower cost of expression to recoup, resulting from
copying from the plaintiff's work rather than creating it entirely himself)
and (2) selling the copies in the first author's market.
Therefore, copyright infringement appears to be much more closely
related to common law misappropriation than to the other federal
intellectual property regime, patent law. More generally, "copyright
infringement" is more like a commercial tort than an intrusion upon a
formal property right.

